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Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid

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Official Records · Forty-eighth Session
Supplement No. 22 (A/48/22)

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

3 November 1993

Excellency,

I have the honour to send you herewith the report of the Special Committee against Apartheid, which was adopted by the Special Committee on 3 November 1993. The report is submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2671 (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and 47/116 A to G of 18 December 1992.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
Chairman
Special Committee against Apartheid

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 47/116 B of 18 December 1992, adopted by consensus, authorized the Special Committee against Apartheid, inter alia, to continue to monitor the complex developments in South Africa, and to collect, analyse and disseminate factual information in that regard. The present report reviews the political process under way in South Africa, the socio-economic situation in the country, its external relations and the response of the international community to developments there. The report, which covers the period from October 1992 to October 1993, also reviews the activities of the Special Committee aimed at facilitating the establishment of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa, as envisaged in the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (resolution S-16/1 of 14 December 1989, annex).

2. In order to obtain a first-hand understanding of the complex and interlinked factors influencing developments in South Africa and how the political process under way could be further encouraged, as well as of the role that the international community could play in that respect, a mission of consultation of the Special Committee, led by its Chairman, visited South Africa in March 1993. The mission offered the Committee an opportunity to establish contacts and hold broad-based consultations with high-ranking representatives of all major parties involved in the ongoing political process and, based on those contacts, to make assessments of the political process under way in South Africa. During the preparation of the present report of the Special Committee, a wide range of sources, including documents, statements, statistics and research publications, periodicals and newspapers, were used. The Special Committee has also taken advantage of conferences, seminars and consultations with governmental and non-governmental organizations to obtain information that was helpful in the course of the preparation of the report.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. Multi-party negotiations: structure and issues

3. After a 10-month deadlock, delegations from 26 political formations 1/ in South Africa (as compared to 19 at the first and second plenary sessions of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I and II)) met on 5 and 6 March for a multi-party planning conference. That conference was the most representative gathering of political leaders so far in South African history, including some parties that had not participated in CODESA I and II, such as the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Conservative Party (CP). The aims of the conference were to bring all parties together, review earlier agreements and prepare for multi-party talks. The parties resumed multi-party negotiations on 1 April 1993, signifying a serious effort to include as wide a spectrum of political parties and formations as possible. The only parties refusing to participate in the talks were the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) and the Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging (AWB, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement). 2/

4. The following structure for the Multi-party Negotiating Process was agreed on: a Plenary (10 delegates from each party), which would formally adopt agreements; a Negotiating Council (4 delegates, one of whom must be a woman, plus 2 advisers); and a Planning Committee. The Negotiating Council negotiates and prepares agreements and positions on pertinent issues on the process where broader agreement or consensus would be sought before ratification by the Plenary. The Planning Committee, composed of 10 members appointed from the Negotiating Council, has met almost daily to prepare debates and draft agreements for the Negotiating Council. The Council has appointed seven technical committees to handle special tasks. 3/ These have concentrated on specific questions, such as constitutional issues; fundamental rights during the transition period; the Transitional Executive Council (TEC); the independent electoral, media and broadcasting commissions; the repeal or amendment of legislation impeding free political activity and of discriminatory legislation; and the issue of violence. The concept of "sufficient consensus" as a mechanism for decision-making has been increasingly utilized in the Multi-party Negotiating Process. The concept is intended to help the process to continue by allowing a party to record its disagreement without blocking a decision agreed on by the other participants.

5. Important issues discussed included the constitutional provisions to apply until a new constitution has been adopted; the powers of the central Government, degree of devolution of powers to regional and local governments, and the exercise of residual powers; the extent and mandatory character of principles for the future constitution to be agreed on in advance of elections, including regional boundaries, and the powers and functions of the regions; the justiciability of disputes regarding the election; rules governing the first election; the question of reincorporation of the "homelands"; and the question of control of the security forces and maintenance of law and order prior to elections. 4/

6. Related to the latter is the question of the integration of all armed formations, including the South African Defence Force (SADF), military wings of the liberation movements and homeland armies, into a truly national defence force. Differences of approach have centred on whether armed formations should be merged with SADF under a new integrated command structure or whether members

of armed formations and homeland armies should apply for inclusion in SADF on an individual basis. 5/

7. With regard to regional boundaries, a Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of Regions has been given the task of making recommendations to the Multi-party Negotiating Council. A first report, submitted in August, did not meet with sufficient agreement and the Commission was asked to continue its work. In the course of negotiations, there have been demands for a separate Afrikaner State to be provided for in the constitution. Whereas the now dissolved Afrikaner Volksunie demanded a region where all speakers of Afrikaans, regardless of race, would be the majority, the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF, the Afrikaner People's Front) and its major member, the CP, demand a State exclusively for White Afrikaners, where neither non-Whites nor non-Afrikaners would be allowed to live.

8. During the period under review discussions continued regarding the reincorporation of the 10 ethnically based homelands into a united South Africa. Their reincorporation and integration has been seen as essential both for the development of the homelands themselves and as a prerequisite for the establishment of a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. 6/

9. It will be recalled that, between 1976 and 1981, 4 of the 10 homelands - Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, also known as the TBVC states - were declared "independent", while the other six (Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa) were called "self-governing" territories. The combined armies of the four TBVC homelands is estimated to be about 20,500. 7/ All 10 homelands have their own police forces. The question of the incorporation of those armed formations into future national security forces as well as their actions in ensuring or curtailing free political activity within their regions has been a subject of debate and controversy during the period under review.

10. Most of the homeland leaders have opposed suggestions for an early reincorporation of their territories. An initial plan of the Government for reincorporation, with priority given to the TBVC states, envisaged reincorporation to take place after the elections in April 1994. That plan was followed by suggestions by the Government that an earlier incorporation would allow the TBVC states to join the new transitional structures to be established in preparation for elections. From the time of reincorporation to the establishment of an interim government of national unity, the TBVC states would each be governed by an administrator-general. The Government, on whose financial support the homelands are entirely dependent, has, however, so far ruled out the use of economic pressure on the homeland authorities.

11. Most of the homelands are landlocked or surrounded by South Africa, often consisting of unconnected patches of territory (KwaZulu consists of no fewer than 10 separate pieces, Bophuthatswana of 8) and having no economic viability of their own. In spite of billions of rand spent by the Government of South Africa to try to give the homelands an economic rationale, they continue to suffer from high unemployment and poverty, despite costly and largely futile efforts to attract industries to the border areas. Recent disclosures of large-scale corruption and irregularities in the homeland administrations point to another obstacle to their development. The independence of the TBVC states was recognized by no other country than South Africa itself. 8/

12. The question of the distribution of powers between a central Government and the country's constituent parts has been closely linked to the process of

reaching agreement on the future constitutional structure of the country. Parties that feel that they enjoy an electoral margin in their own regions therefore favour strong regional powers as they fear that they would get limited voter support in nation-wide elections. They have argued for negotiating a new final constitution in the Multi-party Negotiating Process itself, where all parties are equally represented, rather than in a nationally elected constituent assembly. In their view, a constitution agreed on in such a manner would then be put to a national referendum for approval.

13. Those parties have also demanded that a number of constitutional principles, including those regarding the powers and boundaries of the respective regions, be agreed on in advance of the elections and be binding on an elected constituent assembly. In the absence of what they have deemed to be sufficient guarantees in that regard, they have suspended their participation in the Multi-party Negotiating Process, following the decision adopted by "sufficient consensus" within the negotiating framework on holding elections on 27 April 1994 for, inter alia, a constituent assembly. However, until October, bilateral negotiations continued on those and other issues between parties that had suspended their participation and major parties remaining in the Multi-party Negotiating Process.

14. A majority of parties to the multi-party negotiations have taken the view that only a democratically elected constituent assembly has the right to draw up a new constitution.

B. Agreements reached

15. On 2 July, the Negotiating Council adopted by consensus a set of binding constitutional principles for a democratic Government, which included provision for a strong central Government but with firmly entrenched provisions to accommodate regional diversity. The justiciability of constitutional principles would be ensured by a constitutional court. A bill of fundamental human rights and an independent judiciary were to be entrenched in the new constitution.

16. Also on 2 July, a decision was taken by "sufficient consensus" by the Multi-party Negotiating Process that non-racial democratic elections to a constitutional assembly would be held on 27 April 1994. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the KwaZulu Government and CP were among seven parties that opposed setting a date at that stage in the negotiating process. 9/

17. On 23 September, the South African Parliament passed a bill (by a vote of 211 to 36) to establish the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) to oversee the preparation for and the transition to a democratic order in South Africa. The main function of the TEC is to level the political field and to oversee and ensure free and fair elections to the constituent assembly. It will do this in conjunction with legislative and executive structures at all levels of government. 10/ Bills were also passed enabling the Independent Media and Electoral Commissions and the Independent Broadcasting Authority to be set up.

18. Subsequent to the agreements by the negotiating parties on the interim constitution and an electoral bill, an explicit decision is to be taken by the Plenary of the Multi-party Negotiating Process approving the total package of agreements, 11/ which would be followed by the actual establishment and commencement of functions by TEC, the Independent Commissions and the Independent Broadcasting Authority. A special session of the existing Parliament is expected to convene in the latter part of November 1993 for the

purpose of passing into law the interim constitution and the electoral bill. Whereas the TEC is expected to function until elections have been held in April 1994, the interim constitution would be in place until a final constitution had been adopted by the elected constituent assembly.

19. TEC will consist of one member from each political party represented in the Multi-party Negotiating Process, on condition that they commit themselves and their armed formations, in writing, to the objectives of the Council, to renounce violence as a means to achieve political goals and to abide by Council decisions. 12/

20. Homeland Governments can take part in TEC after they have included the TEC act in their respective laws. Parties that have not participated in the multi-party negotiations can join TEC subject to the same stipulations.

21. It has been agreed that TEC will have seven Subcouncils: (a) on law and order, stability and security; (b) defence; (c) intelligence; (d) regional/local government and traditional authorities; (e) finance; (f) foreign affairs; and (g) the status of women. The Subcouncil on Law and Order, Stability and Security, as well as those on defence and intelligence, will consist of eight members and will require a 75 per cent majority to reach decision. The remaining Subcouncils will consist of six members and will require a majority of 66.7 per cent in order to reach decisions. The legislation also allows for the setting up of a multi-party national peace force with functions relating to the maintenance of peace and public order and answerable to the Subcouncil on Defence. 11/

22. TEC is to be kept informed by the State President and Cabinet Ministers of any proposed legislation, decisions and intended actions and, if 75 per cent of its members so decide, it can stop legislation and reverse a government decision. It can request all documents and information and can conduct investigations and delegate powers to its Subcouncils. The State President must consult TEC before declaring a state of emergency or unrest areas in the country. TEC can review such a decision and decide to reverse it by an 80 per cent majority. Provision is made for dispute resolution by a special electoral court. 13/

23. The Independent Electoral Commission will consist of seven to eleven members to be appointed by the State President on the recommendation of TEC. That Commission will manage the first elections and any referendum that may be conducted. International experts will be appointed in an advisory capacity to work with the Commission. The Commission will also have an election administration directorate, an election monitoring directorate and an election adjudication secretariat. 14/

24. The Independent Media Commission is to consist of seven members appointed by TEC to oversee the equitable treatment of political parties by media and broadcasting services and will ensure that state-controlled publications and information services do not advance the interest of any political party over the others.

25. The Independent Broadcasting Authority, consisting of six members appointed by the State President on the recommendation of TEC, will assume responsibility for the allocation of licences and will monitor radio and television broadcasts during the period before the elections to ensure that they are even-handed and do not favour any party or organization. Licences will be issued to public,

private and community radio and television. Political parties are to be excluded from broadcasting licences. 15/

26. Whereas both CP and IFP have opposed the decision by the Multi-party Negotiating Process on TEC, members representing IFP abstained when the TEC bill was passed. They also voted in favour of the bills on the Independent Media and Electoral Commissions, and on the Independent Broadcasting Authority. CP voted against all four bills. 16/

C. Other political developments relating to the process of peaceful settlement

27. It will be recalled that in June 1992 ANC suspended talks with the Government. Following renewed contacts between the two parties, a series of bilateral meetings between the Government of South Africa, the leaders of South African liberation movements and other political parties at the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 paved the way for the resumption of full-scale multi-party negotiations in April 1993. 17/

28. It will also be recalled that PAC had withdrawn from preparatory talks leading to the creation of CODESA in November 1991. However, following a meeting on 23 and 24 October 1992 in Gaborone, the Government of South Africa and PAC issued a joint statement in which both parties agreed that the political conflict in South Africa should be resolved through peaceful negotiations and that maximum effort should be exerted by all parties to bring an end to violence in the country. They also agreed on the urgent need for the establishment of a more representative negotiating forum, which should be "as inclusive as possible and should be managed impartially". 18/ Since that time, the Government of South Africa and PAC have held further bilateral talks focusing mainly on the issue of cessation of the armed struggle. PAC has stated that it would cease armed struggle only when agreement had been reached on a constituent assembly and a transitional authority. 19/

29. On 6 October 1992, the homeland leaders of KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, IFP, CP and the Afrikaner Volksunie formed the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG). The Group stated its opposition to agreements reached in bilateral negotiations between the Government of South Africa and ANC. The Group also called for the replacement of CODESA by a more representative forum and for the military wing of ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe, or MK, to be disbanded before the resumption of multi-party negotiations. 20/

30. In December 1992, a proposal to set up an autonomous federal KwaZulu/Natal state presented by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was adopted by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. This has been criticized by both ANC and the Government as detrimental to the political process under way in the country. 21/

31. At a bilateral meeting held from 9 to 12 February 1993, the Government of South Africa and ANC agreed that elections should be called within a year to a constituent assembly that would draft and adopt a new constitution and, at the same time, serve as an interim parliament. Parties that would get a certain minimum percentage of votes would be entitled to participate in a coalition cabinet. This "interim government of national unity" would serve for five years. Elections would then take place under a new constitution. Primary discussions were also held with regard to TEC and its role in overseeing the conduct of security forces, the media and electoral mechanisms. 22/

32. In May 1993, the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF, the Afrikaner People's Front), a new umbrella organization comprised of 17 White right-wing groups, including prominently the Conservative Party, was established with the former Chief of SADF, General Constand Viljoen as leader. The creation of AVF had been preceded by the formation of a "Generals' Committee" consisting of several well-known retired top-ranking officers from the army and the military intelligence establishment. 23/ The group seeks Afrikaner self-determination and is opposed to multi-party control of the security forces in the run-up to elections in April 1994. Whereas CP has declared itself ready for armed resistance should the transition process continue, General Viljoen has exhorted members of AVF to resist within constitutional and non-violent means.

33. In the course of 1993, bilateral meetings have been held between the Government of South Africa and IFP, as well as between ANC and IFP. ANC has also conducted bilateral discussions with AVF.

34. With regard to the latter, reports indicate that both sides had agreed to recognize each other as fellow South Africans and settle their differences through negotiations. However, CP, the largest grouping in AVF, and AWB did not participate in the talks. The question of modalities for an Afrikaner "homeland" or a "volkstaat" comprising parts of Transvaal and the Orange Free State is reported to have been discussed. 24/

35. In July 1993, the Government had proposed that the Commission on the Demarcation/Delineation of Regions consider the establishment of such a federal state on condition that it would not practise any discrimination and had asked the leader of AVF, General Viljoen, to submit proposals on self-determination at the Multi-party Negotiating Council. 25/

36. In that context, Mr. Nelson Mandela, at a press conference held at United Nations Headquarters on 24 September 1993, stated that:

> "The democratization of the political process in South Africa has aroused concerns on the part of the minority there. Fears and concerns, which though they may be baseless, are genuine. It is the task of ANC, with other democratic formations, to address those fears realistically and seriously. ANC has engaged in discussions with all political parties, including the right-wing."

With regard to the question of an Afrikaner "homeland", he stated that ANC could reject an ethnic solution without rejecting the basic demands of people wanting a particular region in which they could run their own affairs. 26/ Following Mr. Mandela's remarks, AVF declared that "without the right of the Afrikaner nation to full self-determination in its own state being recognized by ANC and the Government, there could be no further talks". 27/

37. On 7 October the homelands of Bophutathswana and Ciskei announced their withdrawal from the Multi-party Negotiating Process. This was followed by an announcement that the COSAG had been disbanded and replaced by a new grouping called the Freedom Alliance. The Alliance consists of the two homeland governments mentioned above, IFP and the White right-wing parties grouped together in AVF, including CP. Putting an end to previous bilateral contacts between its various members and the Government and ANC respectively, the new grouping declared that it would henceforth only discuss outstanding issues through a joint negotiating team. 28/

38. On 24 September 1993, Mr. Nelson Mandela addressed the Special Committee against Apartheid meeting in the United Nations General Assembly Hall. He stated that TEC would mark the first ever participation by the majority of the South African people at governmental levels in the process of determining the destiny of their country. Mr. Mandela termed TEC the historic precursor to the interim Government of national unity to be formed subsequent to South Africa's first non-racial elections, and stated that although the people of South Africa had not yet elected a democratic Government, TEC would provide the appropriate mechanism for interaction with the international community until the formation of a new government. 26/

39. Mr. Mandela further stated:

> "The time has come when the international community should lift all economic sanctions against South Africa in response to the historic advances towards democracy that have been achieved, in order to give added impetus to this process and to strengthen the forces of democratic change to help create the necessary conditions for stability and social progress." 29/

40. Addressing the Special Committee on 28 September 1993, PAC Secretary-General Mr. Benny Alexander informed the Committee that the National Executive Committee of PAC had met on 18 and 19 September 1993 at Johannesburg and had decided not to join TEC, but that PAC would continue to take part in the multi-party negotiations and would participate in the elections to the constituent assembly in April 1994 and in the work of that body. Earlier in a statement explaining its position for abstaining from the decision of the Multi-party Negotiating Process setting up TEC, PAC underlined its opposition because in its view the Government of South Africa would retain control of SADF and the South African Police (SAP) during the period leading up to the elections in April 1994. PAC stated that SADF and SAP were major actors in the ongoing violence in the country.

41. As to sanctions, PAC was of the view that TEC constituted neither a new Government nor an important shift of power, and could not be used as a reference point on whether to lift the remaining economic sanctions. PAC called for existing sanctions to remain in effect "until a new constitution is in place to ensure elections for a new Government". 30/

42. Following the subsequent decision by the Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), on 29 September 1993, to call upon all the African States, the international community at large and the United Nations in particular, to respond positively to Mr. Mandela's appeal, and following consultations held with States Members of the United Nations by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, the General Assembly, on 8 October 1993, decided by consensus to lift all the economic sanctions imposed against South Africa, with immediate effect, and to lift the oil embargo against South Africa as of the date when TEC would become operational (resolution 48/1). 31/

43. On 15 October, the Nobel Prize Committee of the Norwegian Parliament decided to award the Nobel Peace Prize for 1993 jointly to ANC President Nelson Mandela and President Frederik Willem de Klerk for their work for the peaceful termination of the apartheid regime and for laying the foundations for a new democratic South Africa. In announcing the award, the Nobel Committee stated that from their different points of departure, Mr. Mandela and Mr. de Klerk had reached an agreement on principles for a

transition to a new political order based on the tenet of one man - one vote. By looking ahead to South African reconciliation instead of back at the deep wounds of the past, they had shown personal integrity and great political courage. The Nobel Committee further stated that Mr. Mandela's and Mr. de Klerk's constructive policy of peace and reconciliation also pointed the way to the peaceful resolution of similar deep-rooted conflicts elsewhere in the world. The Nobel Peace Prize for 1993 had been awarded in recognition of their efforts and as a pledge of support for the forces of good, in the hope that the advance towards equality and democracy would reach its goal in the very near future (see para. 201).

44. On 19 October, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on a visit to Maputo, met with IFP leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and with PAC President Clarence Makwetu. In his discussions with the two leaders the Secretary-General stressed the importance accorded to the multi-party negotiations and to the formation of TEC by the international community. He emphasized the need for participation in the negotiations and in TEC, respectively, and for all parties to work together constructively to decrease the levels of violence and to create and sustain an atmosphere of political tolerance. The Secretary-General also met with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha. 32/

D. Violence and intimidation

45. Violence, including political and economic crime, continued at unprecedented levels, taking a high toll in human lives and destruction of property, and spreading fear and anguish throughout the country. In its reports, the Human Rights Commission of South Africa underlined the fact that incidents increased markedly each time progress was achieved in the multi-party negotiations and also pointed out that the months recording the highest death toll were August 1990 (709 deaths), when the Pretoria Minute was adopted by ANC and the Government of South Africa, and following 2 July 1993 (605 deaths), when the date for elections to a constitutional assembly was announced (see table 1). 33/

Table 1. Statistical summary on violence, July 1990 to June 1993

	July 1990-June 1991	July 1991-June 1992	July 1992-June 1993	Total	
National statistics					
Incident count	2 166	3 534	4 178	9 878	274/month
Death count	3 190	3 039	3 096	9 325	259/month
Injury count	6 855	5 033	5 085	16 973	471/month
Major massacres	34	15	12	51	1.7/month
Political arrests	8 211	8 725	9 137	26 073	724/month
Regional death statistics					
Natal	1 004	1 004	1 645	3 653	39.2%; 101/m
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging	1 982	1 688	1 086	4 756	51.0%; 132/m
Other regions	204	347	365	916	9.8%; 25/m
Sources of deaths					
General incidents	2 903	2 806	2 871	8 580	92.0%; 238/m
Security forces	238	114	166	518	5.6%; 14/m
Hit squads	28	96	49	173	1.8%; 5/m
Right wing	21	23	10	54	0.8%; 1.5/m
Some victims					
Train commuters	67	227	107	401	11/month
Bus and taxi commuters		119	84		
Women		189	253		
Children		106	58		
Security force members		68	200		
White civilians			34		

Source: Human Rights Commission of South Africa, supplement to Special Report SR-13, Three years of Destabilization. Statistical Summary, 28 September 1993.

46. The worst massacres were perpetrated in attacks on or armed assaults in townships and squatter, rural and urban communities by vigilante groups and unknown hit men, on some occasions alleged to be covert security forces. The number of attacks on train and taxi commuters have also increased. Violent rivalry between hostel dwellers and townships residents and between competing taxi operators increased, as well as violence during marches, rallies and funerals of victims of political confrontation.

47. Political violence within Black communities abated somewhat in the first half of the year, resulting in 1,387 deaths. Natal continued to account for the largest number of casualties - 774 deaths - as compared to 441 deaths reported in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging region and 202 in all other parts of the country for the first six months of 1993. However, the unprecedented violence in July 1993 in the East Rand, which is a subregion of the region, brought the total death count to 605 for that month alone from a monthly average of 231 deaths (compared with a monthly average of 292 during 1992). Some 554 deaths were reported in August, the third highest toll on record in the last three years. The two regions together accounted for 90 per cent of political violence in the country. The average daily death rate was 18, more than double the average for the last three years. 34/

48. There was a marked increase in attacks against civilian Whites, resulting in 34 being killed during the first half of the year. In addition, 12 White civilians were gunned down while attending a church service at St. James' Church in Kenilworth near Capetown on 25 July 1993. There was also a clear increase in the number of media reporters attacked or killed. At least 130 policemen were killed in the first seven months of 1993, with an average of 18 a month. 34/

49. On 25 May 1993, SAP, in a series of pre-dawn raids, rounded up 73 PAC members, including members of PAC negotiating team, and confiscated office property. The raid, which occurred on the day scheduled for discussing the setting of an election date, was widely viewed as the work of those in the Government of South Africa who wanted to damage negotiations. Following a meeting with PAC, the Government agreed that the PAC leaders would be released and those who had cases to answer would be charged immediately. The Government also agreed to report on the other detainees and return material and property confiscated. PAC later stated that all the property had not been returned and some of the returned property was damaged. PAC decided to remain at multi-party talks in spite of the provocative nature of the event. On 26 May, President de Klerk stated in Parliament that the raid had had no political motive. 35/ On 2 August 1993, SAP again raided the homes of PAC members in Soweto and arrested 22 persons in connection with activities of the organization's military wing. They were released after questioning, but two were arrested again in connection with alleged criminal activity. 36/

50. On 10 April 1993, Mr. Chris Hani, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), was assassinated. Mr. Janusz Jakob Walus, a Polish immigrant and member of AWB and CP, and a former member of the President's Council, Mr. Clive Derby-Lewis, were found guilty of the murder and complicity in committing it, respectively, and were sentenced to death. 37/ Reports indicate that Mr. Walus had used a weapon that was part of a cache stolen from the South African Air Force (SAAF) three years previously by airmen aligned to AWB.

51. Adding to the general atmosphere of intolerance and fear, on 25 June 1993, members of AWB also attacked and assaulted negotiators at the multi-party negotiations under way at the World Trade Centre at Johannesburg. The failure

of the police to act decisively against members of AWB involved in the incident further undermined the credibility of SAP and underlined the need for joint control of police and security forces (see para. 67).

52. In August 1993, it was reported that SADF had been distributing sophisticated assault weapons to White farmers through the "commando" system. The commandos originated as local militias in South Africa under Dutch colonial rule in the seventeenth century and are now reported to number 140,000. The military authorities justified their action as a self-defence measure for White farmers following attacks on White farms and homesteads. 38/

53. In a raid conducted during the night of 8 October, South African soldiers shot dead five young people as they slept in a house at Umtata in the Transkei homeland. Two of the victims were reported to have been 12 years old. A Defence Force statement claimed that the house was used as a base of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (PAC military wing) base and had been under surveillance for days. Police admitted that forensic tests had been unable to link the weapons found in the house with any crimes. 39/

54. The United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa, together with the observer missions of OAU and the Commonwealth, issued a statement on 9 October at Johannesburg condemning the raid by SADF, which had been authorized by the highest levels of government and had resulted in the killing of innocent children and young people. The statement noted that the raid had taken place a day before the United Nations General Assembly was scheduled to lift economic sanctions against South Africa.

55. While to a large extent violence in South Africa continues to be rooted in the legacies of the apartheid system, human rights observers have noted that other variables that now contribute to the violence also include fighting for political domination, struggle for scarce economic resources, ethnic and racial hatreds, criminal gangs exploiting the political instability and revenge killers settling old scores. The pattern appears to indicate that violence attributed to other than political motives has also assumed a serious dimension. The easy availability of firearms and their frequent use in politically motivated incidents appears to have set an example that has not been lost on trigger-prone robbers, who now use similar weapons and contribute to the increasing sense that the authorities have lost control over the situation. 40/

56. It had been widely believed in South Africa that a high-level meeting between ANC and IFP could help resolve much of the political violence and create more favourable grounds for South Africa's first democratic elections. The long-awaited meeting between Mr. Mandela and Chief Buthelezi took place on 23 June 1993 at Johannesburg and was chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Bishop Stanley Mogoba. The two leaders issued a joint statement in which they expressed the determination of their organizations to seek ways and means to end the violence and to promote national reconciliation. They agreed to hold joint peace rallies and called for the strengthening of the National Peace Accord. However the meeting failed to lead to an agreement between them on setting a date for elections. Following the decision on 2 July within the multi-party negotiating framework on holding elections in April 1994, the level of violence increased markedly. 41/

57. The political debate on ways to curb the violence has in recent months focused on the possibility of a joint or combined domestic peace-keeping force. In its resolution of 22 June on conditions that should be created to eliminate violence, the Multi-party Negotiating Process had included a proposal for the

establishment of an independent national peace-keeping force with a multi-party composition to function in the run-up to and during the election. While the idea was, at that time, in principle backed by the Government, ANC and IFP, they differed on how such a force should be created. The Government envisaged it as an auxiliary of the existing police, under the ultimate control of the State President. ANC insisted that the force must be truly multi-party in nature and developed as such. IFP was of the view that it should not supersede the authority of existing forces, such as the 8,000 KwaZulu police, 42/ and should include equal numbers of recruits from different political groupings. CP condemned the idea of a multi-party peace-keeping force and called on the Government instead to impose a state of emergency.

58. There have also been some calls for international peace-keepers, but a more common view in South Africa in that regard now seems to be that international organizations, such as the United Nations, should be requested to assist only in the training of a multi-party domestic peace-keeping force and its commanders.

59. A panel of experts chaired by United States Attorney Charles Ruff on 4 August submitted a report to the Goldstone Commission recommending that a national peace-keeping service be established under multi-party civilian command. However, the panel had doubts about the feasibility of forging an integrated, trained peace-keeping force in time for elections in April 1994. 43/

60. In the legislation adopted by the existing Parliament on the establishment of TEC, provisions are also made for the creation of a national peace-keeping force, which is to consist of members of all armed forces and to the extent possible, in equal numbers. The force will have a distinctive uniform of its own, its functions will relate to the maintenance of peace and public order, and it will be answerable to the TEC Sub-Council on Defence. 44/

61. Discussions have also been held between ANC and PAC on uniting their respective military wings. The willingness of ANC to work with existing security forces under certain conditions, on the one hand, and the determination of PAC not to renounce the armed struggle, on the other, have made an agreement difficult to achieve. 45/

62. In August 1993, a commission appointed by ANC and headed by Mr. Samuel Motsuenyane, the retired head of a Black business association, and aided by Ms. Margaret Burnham, a former judge of the Boston (United States) municipal court who teaches political science at the University of Massachusetts, and Mr. David M. Zamchiya, a lawyer from Zimbabwe, confirmed persistent allegations regarding the involvement of some ANC members in the violation of the rights of detainees held by ANC. The commission's investigation revealed that from the late 1970s until 1991 ANC security officers guarding prison camps for suspected spies and infiltrators in Angola and Zambia tortured and killed at least 16 detainees. The commission's report stated that the killings and torture were not systematic but were the result of a serious breakdown in communication between ANC's political and military wings. The report named several current ANC officials and recommended that disciplinary action be taken. The ANC initiative has been widely welcomed as an act of candid self-criticism. The Congress has accepted collective responsibility and apologized for what happened, but has declined to discipline those accused or to pay compensation to the victims or their families. ANC has stated that a distinction exists between abuses carried out in defence of apartheid and those committed in the struggle against it. On 10 September, ANC called for the establishment of a national "truth commission" to investigate all human rights violations by all parties since 1948. 46/

E. National Peace Accord

63. The National Peace Accord was signed on 14 September 1991. Among the 24 signatories were political parties and organizations, trade unions and civic organizations. The Accord, which contains a code of conduct both for the security forces and for political parties and organizations, allows for mechanisms to implement and enforce its provisions, and proposes specific measures to facilitate socio-economic reconstruction and development in the areas devastated by violence. Some political parties and organizations, including CP, the governments of the Bophuthatswana, Transkei and Venda homelands, and PAC, did not sign the accord.

64. One important development has been the setting up of several new regional and local peace committees in an effort to involve as many actors as possible to deal with violence at the grassroots level, and to build confidence between communities, the security forces and political parties. Socio-economic factors are important causes of violence in South African society. However, sufficient funds have not been made available to regional and local peace committees to enable them to undertake community-based development programmes at an adequate level.

65. The Goldstone Commission, as part of its investigations into the role of the security forces of various parties in the ongoing political violence, raided an SADF military intelligence unit in November 1992 and seized files that showed that a campaign had been conducted by it to discredit ANC. The Commission's report led to the suspension and retirement of 23 high-ranking officers of SADF, including two generals and four brigadiers, for illegal activities and malpractice. 47/

66. In its third interim report, released in December 1992, the Goldstone Commission recommended that political actors who attack political opponents in ways that breach the Peace Accord be banned from addressing public meetings. 48/ Specific recommendations were also reiterated on the carrying of weapons in public, fencing of hostels and the conduct of and regulations guiding political and public gatherings. On several occasions Justice Goldstone has publicly criticized the Government, political leaders and the security forces for failing to act appropriately on recommendations of the Commission.

67. In a report on the AWB raid on the World Trade Centre at Johannesburg in June 1993 (see para. 51), the Goldstone Commission concluded that the police were guilty of dereliction of duty by not organizing a strong and visible show of force during the assault and stated that it was clear that the occupation of the building was "anything but spontaneous" and that the police had known that the confrontation with AWB was "inevitable". 49/

68. The Goldstone Commission has also conducted probes into smuggling of arms into South Africa, the activities of APLA and of the KwaZulu Police, as well as into allegations of military intelligence involvement in fomenting conflict, inquests into political assassinations and the violence occurring in the East Rand since July 1993.

69. In an effort to create a favourable climate for the country's first democratic elections, a month-long peace campaign was initiated with the celebration of Peace Day on 2 September 1993 throughout the country. The campaign was organized by the National Peace Committee and was supported by all major political parties except extreme right-wing groups. In major towns

traffic and business activity was stopped at noon and people wearing blue and yellow ribbons observed a minute of silence as a mark of respect to those who had died due as a result of the political violence. A minute of silence was also observed by radio and television stations, and church bells were sounded. President F. W. de Klerk, ANC President Nelson Mandela and IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi took part in the observance of Peace Day by addressing thousands of people, urging them to put an end to violence.

70. It will be recalled that in response to the grave situation prevailing in South Africa in the summer of 1992 and in accordance with Security Council resolution 772 (1992), the Secretary-General deployed the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa in September 1992 to work in close collaboration with the structures set up under the National Peace Accord, which it strives to strengthen in consultation with the relevant parties, including the National Peace Secretariat, the Commission regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation and the national, regional and local peace committees that have been established under the terms of the Accord.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. Economic performance

71. There are signs that the South African economy is coming out of the longest recession it has suffered this century. The current recession began in March 1989, with the economy experiencing three consecutive years of negative growth. GDP grew by 1.4 per cent during the first quarter of 1993, the first positive growth rate since the third quarter of 1991, and by 5.1 per cent in the second quarter of 1993. 50/ Agricultural output fell by 24 per cent during 1992, in large part because of the drought. 51/ Although the direct contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP is only about 5 per cent, more than 6 million people are directly dependent on it and indirect effects on employment and output are much larger than its share in GDP reveals.

72. The recession has severely affected employment, exacerbating an already low employment growth rate over the last 15 years. The Reserve Bank of South Africa has estimated that 288,000 non-agricultural jobs have been lost from 1989, the beginning of the recession, to the end of 1992. 52/ Total mining employment declined by 20 per cent between 1987 and November 1992 as a result of declining gold prices during that period. 53/

73. The recession was also marked by a further decline in investment because of depressed demand and political uncertainties. Investment, which had declined by 5 percentage points as a percentage of GDP, dropped by nearly 10 percentage points between 1981 and 1987. Gross domestic fixed investment fell 4 per cent in the first quarter of 1993, the seventeenth consecutive quarterly decline. The 1992-1993 budget deficit, initially projected at 4.5 per cent of GDP, in effect reached 8.6 per cent. Revenues were lower than expected because of the recession and expenditures were higher, owing mainly to drought relief spending. 52/

74. South Africa's inflation rate fell in December 1992 to its lowest level in 14 years and is now below 10 per cent. The year-to-year monthly inflation rate has been declining almost continuously from its high point of 16.8 per cent in October 1991. The factors underlying that decline have been depressed demand, declining food prices, falling mortgage rates and a strong exchange rate, which prevented the large grain imports resulting from the drought to feed into the inflation rate. In early 1993, the inflation rate increased slightly, resulting in part from the one-time hike in the VAT rate. The downward trend in the inflation rate prompted the Reserve Bank to cut the discount rate in February 1993 to 13 per cent, the fourth cut of one percentage point since March 1992, when it was 16 per cent. 54/

75. South Africa's current account deteriorated in 1992, owing largely to the drought. The current account surplus fell from R6.2 billion ($2.2 billion) in 1991 to R3.9 billion ($1.4 billion) in 1992. During the first quarter of 1993, the surplus on the current account declined even further, to R0.7 billion, which could not be attributed to the drought but rather reflected an increase in the price and volume of non-agricultural imports. 52/

76. During 1992, total capital outflow amounted to R6.2 billion ($2.2 billion), compared to R4.8 billion ($1.7 billion) in 1991. A further outflow of R3.7 billion was recorded during the first quarter of 1993. The total gross gold and foreign reserves declined from R13.2 billion in August 1992 to

R9.5 billion in March 1993, reflecting the smaller current account surplus and the capital outflow. 52/

77. However, the price of gold started to increase in March 1993. The average price of gold was $343 per troy ounce in 1992, the lowest price since 1985, and it stayed at about $330 per troy ounce between January and March 1993, but then increased between mid-March and early July to $390 per troy ounce, the highest price paid in two and a half years, despite a slight fall in June. 55/ Moreover, after several years of negative investment flows, the last few months of 1992 and the first months of 1993 showed a positive portfolio investment flow. 56/ Portfolio investments, however, are volatile and the trend might therefore easily be reversed when conditions change.

78. Merchandise imports in dollars increased by 4.4 per cent in 1992. Merchandise exports declined marginally in dollars, but rose by 6.3 per cent in rand, despite a drought-related decline in agricultural exports. 57/

79. The current budget presented in March 1993 projects decline of the deficit to 6.8 per cent of GDP. Other measures included in the budget consist of the raising of the VAT rate from 10 to 14 per cent, while the range of food items zero-rated is widened; increases in some customs and excise duties and in the levy on fuel; and the reduction of the corporate marginal tax rate from 48 to 40 per cent and the introduction of a 15 per cent tax on dividends to encourage investments of profits. 54/

80. Allocations to the Department of Defence are to be reduced by 3.8 per cent. However, total defence expenditures will decline by only 1.3 per cent and a large share of military expenditures remains secret. 58/

81. The budget continues to earmark a modest increase in social expenditures. Social expenditures are to increase by 8 per cent and account now for nearly half of total expenditures. Expenditure on education is to be raised by 12 per cent and on housing and related services by 28 per cent. Supplementary expenditure proposals were also presented with the budget: R60 million for the job creation initiatives of the National Economic Forum, R200 million for housing (in addition to R200 million), R15 million for the promotion of small businesses (in addition to R98 million) and R25 million for tourism (in addition to R85 million), as well as the elevation of the pensions of Blacks to the same level as those of Whites. 54/

82. In March 1993, the Minister of Finance presented a long-term restructuring programme in a report entitled The Restructuring of the South African Economy: A Normative Model Approach. 59/ The programme is to be discussed, for example, in the National Economic Forum, the platform that seeks to build consensus between Government, the business community and the trade unions on socio-economic policies. The document outlines the weaknesses in the economy and recommendations to increase the growth potential of the economy. The report recommended the following policy measures to improve the growth potential: maintaining monetary and fiscal discipline, curbing inflation, reducing the tax burden and changing the tax structure, privatization, increasing domestic competition and exposure to international competition, export promotion and measures aimed at attracting foreign capital.

83. Growth is seen as a prerequisite to other objectives, such as the alleviation of poverty and the socio-economic development of disadvantaged groups. The programme recognizes that growth itself will not automatically result in an improvement of the living standards of the poor and that additional

measures would be necessary to address the disparities in the socio-economic sectors.

84. According to the report, the South African economy has shown a steady increase in the capital-to-labour ratio, in particular between 1960 and 1985, and a high capital-to-output ratio. The report emphasizes the importance of reversing those trends in order to improve the growth potential and increase employment. It recommends special attention to the sectors with high employment-creation potential, for example, the informal and small business sector and less restricted access to economic opportunities.

85. In order to facilitate entry to markets, especially by participants in the informal sector, the report calls for the reduction of public and private regulation, including cartels. The model envisions an active role for the Government in providing subsidies, financial, health, education and training services, investment in infrastructure, public sector purchases from small businesses and through initiating labour-intensive public projects, in particular in disadvantaged areas. Such measures should be implemented in particular in those areas and sections of the population with the highest unemployment rate.

86. Table 2 summarizes some of the targets specified in the report and compares them with the realized values of the period 1985 to 1991. Some organizations have criticized the programme because it insufficiently addressed the high unemployment rate among Blacks in particular. 60/ The target growth rate of formal employment is, for example, only 0.1 percentage points higher than the growth rate of the total labour force. One point of criticism is that the programme focuses on increasing investment through increasing savings. Large-scale upliftment programmes in a stagnating economy, which are not aimed at promoting sustained economic growth and result in an extensive redistribution of income, which, in turn, has a negative impact on saving, will inevitably restrict growth. Other economists have argued that redistribution would increase demand and hence encourage investment. Profit expectations, raised by higher demand, combined with a more stable economic and political environment, would induce investments. On the other hand, the availability of finance as such will not provoke more investment if demand and profit expectations are low.

87. In May 1993, the Southern Africa Department of the World Bank issued a paper entitled "An economic perspective on South Africa". 61/ The paper describes the factors underlying the decline in economic performance over the last two decades, and the current recession in particular, and the rising unemployment. It lists five reasons why the growth in employment has been so slow: firstly, the decline in the growth of investment and the increase in the capital-to-output ratio; secondly, the channelling of investment towards sectors, for example, the public sector, with high capital-to-output and capital-to-labour ratios; thirdly, the acquisition of skills has been insufficient, which has lowered the return to investment; fourthly, the work input of unskilled labour has deteriorated, owing to commuting distance and strikes; and finally, the costs of labour has risen, encouraging capital intensity. The paper recommends four measures to maximize employment growth and reduce income differences: raising public investment in infrastructure and public services; upgrading semi-skilled and unskilled workers; creating jobs in small businesses and agriculture; and re-orientating manufacturing towards exports that will stimulate productivity growth. A pact between major employers and trade unions, in which employers would provide training and unions would limit strikes, could encourage private sector involvement in the improvement of skills outside the immediate needs of the firm.

Table 2. Realization and targets of selected economic indicators according to the economic restructuring programme

Period	Realized values 1985-1991	Target values 1992-2000
Gini coefficient	0.60	
	(annual percentage change)	
Capital-to-labour ratio	1.4	-0.5
Multifactor productivity	0.3	0.75
Real wages	-0.1	0.65
GDP	0.8	3.6
Consumer prices	15.3 a/	5.0 a/
Formal employment	-0.1	2.9
Gini coefficient	-0.2	-0.7
	(as a percentage of GDP)	
Net capital inflow	-2.9	0.7
Gross fixed investment	17.8 a/	24.1 a/
Merchandise exports	19.1	23.5
Government expenditures	30.2	30.2
	(as a percentage of the total labour force)	
Formal sector employment	56.6 a/	60.7 a/

Source: Government of South Africa, The Restructuring of the South African Economy: A Normative Model Approach, March 1993.

a/ End of period.

B. Socio-economic issues

88. During the period under review, some progress was made in efforts to agree on measures that would address the critical needs in the socio-economic sectors. Non-governmental organizations, workers and employers organizations, students' and teachers' groups, liberation movements and government departments have played an important role in organizing forums that have sought to address such critical issues. The following forums have been set up: the National Economic Forum, the National Housing Forum, the National Electrification Forum, the Local Government Negotiating Forum, the National Consultative Forum on Drought, and the National Education and Training Forum. 62/ The forums were established as a means to address immediately those crucial socio-economic problems which could no longer wait for the outcome of national political negotiations, to counter unilateral restructuring by the Government of South Africa and to develop

recommendations that might be included in the institutional structures being agreed upon at the multi-party negotiations.

Housing

89. The National Housing Forum, one of the most representative forums convened so far, is currently discussing a draft housing policy document aimed at presenting workable directions for housing development, including negotiating joint control over the R326 million the Government has set aside for upgrading hostels. Other projects to be overseen by the Forum include housing in the inner cities, informal settlements and land tenure. The Department of National Housing has made available R200 million to the National Housing Forum. 63/

90. Close to 1.5 million families remain homeless, with little low-cost construction being undertaken at present. Since 1990, housing conditions for Blacks have actually deteriorated. Squatters in the Johannesburg area have increased fourfold, to about 400,000. According to housing specialists, by the year 2000, the Johannesburg area alone will have to accommodate 3 million Black residents. 64/ The Independent Development Trust, a leading community development group, aims to provide 110,000 residential sites to homeless families before the end of year through its capital subsidy scheme. 65/

Electricity/drought

91. The aim of the National Electrification Forum is to develop and implement a programme that would lead to general access to affordable electricity for the population as rapidly as possible. The scheme seeks to increase the provision of electricity from approximately 2.4 million consumers at present to 30 million people still living in homes without electricity. According to the National Utility Service International Electricity Price Survey, South Africa remains one of the world's cheapest suppliers of electricity, with an average 12.4 cents per kilowatt hour. 66/ Only 15 to 20 per cent of Black South Africans, however, have electricity in their homes. It is expected that electrification of the townships would reduce air pollution by 75 per cent. 67/

Labour

92. According to a report of the Standard Bank of South Africa, there were 1,982 registered unions in South Africa at the beginning of 1990, with a total membership of about 2.4 million. In 1991, there were six confederations: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), the Federation of Independent Trade Unions (FITU), the Federation of Salaried Staff Associations (FEDSAL), the United Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA) and the South African Confederation of Labour (SACOL). COSATU, formed in December 1985, has been involved in political issues throughout its existence. 68/

93. Following the VAT strike in November 1991 when 3.5 million workers stayed away from work and demands from COSATU together with other trade union organizations, a National Economic Forum was founded in October 1992. The Forum has sought to secure agreement between the Government, the private sector and labour over the restructuring of the economy. In July 1993, several agreements were concluded with regard to labour practices: a national job creation scheme, directed at the provision of infrastructure, a small-business development programme and assistance to entrepreneurs in particular geographic areas were to be set up under the direction of the Forum. The parties to it recognized the value of industry-level bargaining and agreed not to oppose the establishment of

centralized bargaining arrangements. On the issue of job security, the parties agreed to full disclosure of information and selection criteria for proposed retrenchments, as well as a fair package for retrenched workers (see paras. 132-138). 69/

94. After more than three years of bargaining with the involvement of the Independent Mediation Services of South Africa, an agreement between COSATU and the South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) was reached on a draft bill providing for the Labour Relations Act to be extended to farmworkers. The new legislation, entitled the Agricultural Labour Act of 1993, is expected to be discussed in the South African Parliament in October 1993. The agreement, a joint SAAU/COSATU/Ministry of Manpower/National Manpower Commission committee would investigate concerns in the agricultural sector and facilitate the implementation of the agreement. The draft law also proposes the extension of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act to farmworkers. 70/ Thousands of farmworkers employed by more than 60,000 private farmers would thereby have legally set working hours, the right to a lunch break, payment for work on Sundays and sick and holiday leave for the first time. 71/

Unemployment

95. The high rate of unemployment remains one of the major challenges facing South Africa. Despite an easing of the drought and prospects for a slowing down in the rate of general economic decline, the business community expects unemployment to increase by a further 900,000 during the next two years. 72/ According to a South African Reserve Bank report released in August 1993, 46 per cent of the labour force were either unemployed or involved in the informal sector. 73/ While that sector is growing fast, meaning that almost half of those not formally employed may have found some other source of income, for example, as street traders or casual labourers, that still left the other half, some 3 million, without any work whatsoever. 74/ The National Economic Forum, which launched a campaign to identify and fund viable job creation projects, announced that it had obtained the R60 million allocated to job creation in the current year's national budget with which it would fund community-based job creation projects. Viability, community involvement and the ability of the project to create jobs were among the guidelines that would influence decisions on funding applications. The Development Bank of Southern Africa is to function as the secretariat for the programme. 75/

Poverty/health issues

96. According to the relief organization Operation Hunger, 90 per cent of Black South Africans are living below the breadline. The situation is deteriorating dramatically. In the Natal/KwaZulu area, thousands of White South Africans were reported to have joined the ranks of the unemployed and poor. 76/

97. Statistics on infant mortality indicate that 4 out of every 10 children in South Africa die before they reach the age of five. It is estimated that diseases, including tuberculosis and intestinal diseases, account for over 90 per cent of known causes of infant mortality. Poor immunization, poor living conditions and malnutrition were also cited as major causes of children's deaths. 77/ According to the Centre for Health Policy Studies at the University of Witwatersrand, rural Black and Coloured communities have an infant mortality rate of at least 2.6 times higher than urban-based communities. 78/ According to a World Bank report, while R22 billion had been spent on health care, of which half was spent on private health care, this was not buying the level of health care the average person could expect. 79/

98. AIDS has began to reach epidemic proportions in South Africa. An analysis by the insurance company Metropolitan Life stated that by the end of the decade 3 million people, more than 10 per cent of the adult population, would carry the HIV virus and 160,000 would be afflicted with AIDS. 80/ Provincial and homeland hospitals are so far the only public sector institutions available for the treatment and care of people with AIDS or HIV. According to the AIDS Consortium, a national body working for AIDS prevention and research, the known allocated budget of R15 million would allot just under R100 per person with AIDS in 1993-1994. 81/

99. The provision of health care in South Africa remains inequitable and inefficient. Health facilities are faced with large numbers of patients who cannot afford to pay. The State still exercises racial discrimination in the per capita health-care expenditure. Whites are entitled to more than double the amount allocated to Blacks. The Witwatersrand Centre for Health Policy has proposed the establishment of a national health insurance fund. Under that scheme, insurance contributions and general taxation revenues would be geared towards financing cost-effective health care for all South Africans. Another newly established institution, the Health System Trust, was aimed to support research and planning to develop a comprehensive health service for South Africa. 82/

Education

100. There has been no major improvement in education during 1992 despite the fact there were less disruptions in school during the year. Nationwide, the average pass rate was 43.8 per cent for Black students (a slight improvement on the previous rate of 39.2 per cent) compared to 96 per cent for Whites. The pass rate was even lower in the township of Soweto, which had experienced many school protests and a high level of violence. Moreover, only 10 per cent of Black students who took the test scored high enough to be considered for university admission. 83/ In general, the education system did not meet the country's need for an adequately skilled workforce and was contributing to the levels of unemployment, frustration and violence.

101. On 26 January 1993, the Minister of National Education, Mr. Piet Marais, released the Education Renewal Strategy, which constituted the Government's point of view on the renewal and restructuring of education. Some of the highlights of the report are compulsory education for at least nine years, equal spending per head across racial categories, creation of a single department to supervise all education in the country, recognition of diversity as a reality and a new system to promote national unity. 84/ While educationalists have been encouraged at the shift to a single non-discriminatory education system, there has been great concern that the report had been made without consultation with the parties concerned. According to non-governmental organizations and educational institutions, the Strategy did not offer remedies in some critical areas such as the needs of disadvantaged students, adult basic education, state-financed pre-school facilities, which the report said were not attainable owing to the large number of pupils involved, and that it placed a limit on the number of students admitted to universities and technikons.

102. The first half of 1993 was marked by widespread disruption in schooling as teachers and pupils increasingly resorted to mass action and confrontational tactics to highlight their grievances. About 40 per cent of learning time had already been lost by the middle of the year through protests, boycotts, marches and the continued disruption of classes. 85/ In May, the National Education Coordinating Committee and the Congress of South African Students initiated a

boycott by Black students protesting the R40 final matriculation examination fee charged to students by the Department of Education. Other student organizations, such as the Pan Africanist Student Organization and the Azanian Students' Movement have advocated the policy of not boycotting classes. 86/ During the same month, teachers belonging to the South African Democratic Teachers Union went on strike over demands for salary increases and reinstatement of teachers retrenched by the Department of Education and Training. 87/ After a meeting between President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela, the Government agreed to set up an education negotiating forum, the suspension of matriculation examination fees and the opening of negotiations on the question of teachers' salaries. 88/

103. After months of a vigorous campaign undertaken by the National Education Committee, which is composed of community organizations, trade unions, student and professional bodies, and political parties, the National Education and Training Forum was launched in August 1993. Trilateral talks leading to the formation of the Forum included the Government of South Africa and the business sector. The Forum secured the Government's promise that all restructuring in education issues would be referred to it. Although the Forum would be responsible for creating a single non-racial education system, the most immediate issues facing it were a strike proposed by Coloured teachers, Black matriculation examinations and classroom disruption. The South African Democratic Teachers Union, with 60,000 members, has called an indefinite strike in August to halt the redundancies and reopen wage negotiations. Despite appalling pupil-teacher ratios, 3,200 teachers were due to lose their jobs by July. The Forum has established a crisis committee to mediate the dispute. 89/

Land

104. Altogether some 3.5 million South Africans were displaced through forced relocations and evictions under the system of apartheid. Following the adoption of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act in June 1991, which annulled the Group Areas Act, the Black Land Act, the Development Trust and Land Act and the Black Communities Development Act, Black South Africans were legally able to buy or occupy properties anywhere in the country. The Advisory Commission on Land Allocation was established to deal with the task of restoration of land to communities and people who had been dispossessed, by acting as an advisory body on land claims. Initiatives for land distribution, however, have raised a host of problems such as what land to redistribute, resistance among White farmers who had built substantial farms on the properties, as well as insistence on the part of those being relocated that they return to the exact same locations as held their ancestral burial grounds. 90/

Immigration

105. Except during a few of the most turbulent years, immigration has outpaced emigration in South Africa since apartheid was established four decades ago. The official 1992 figures were 8,688 immigrants to 4,289 emigrants. Those statistics, however, miss what many experts believed was a sizeable unofficial flow in both directions. Immigrants were mostly from the rest of Africa, Eastern Europe, China, Taiwan Province of China, India, Pakistan and other countries. According to estimates of SAP, there are more than 1 million immigrants living in South Africa, resulting in increased unemployment, homelessness and crime. The majority of illegal immigrants are reported to be from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, and to live in squatter and informal settlements. 91/ It is expected that, in the next year or two, the influx of foreign workers will increase as a new Government seeks more doctors and

teachers to serve previously neglected areas. 92/ Official statistics showed a 9 per cent rise in professionals emigrating in the first nine months of 1992. However, emigration statistics are regarded as meaningless because it is believed most migrants leave "on holiday", failing to return. A research group, the Human Sciences Research Council, estimated that a quarter of a million South African Whites, out of a total population of 5.5 million, were considering emigration. 93/

Environment

106. In its report of March 1992 to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the Department of Environment Affairs indicated that government policies under apartheid had aggravated environmental degradation. The policy of moving large numbers of people to the homelands had not led to economic development but had aggravated poverty and had resulted in the overexploitation of agricultural land and incalculable environmental damage. ANC has stated that the linkages between environmental degradation and the socio-economic crisis within South Africa parallel global patterns. PAC has stated that its environmental policy would adopt a holistic approach, committing itself to the conservation of ecosystems and biotic diversity and accepting the concept of sustainable development, that is, the wise and non-destructive use of resources, with the understanding that a prerequisite for sustainability is that disparities in social, economic and political development be ended. 94/ According to a report by the Black Sash, the unequal agricultural system had led to overpopulation, overgrazing and inappropriate land use in the homelands, which in turn had resulted in serious soil erosion in large parts of Ciskei, KwaZulu and Transkei. In 1992, there were 400 environmental groups in South Africa and all had a predominantly White membership. Environmental experts are of the view that factors such as the impact of colonization, the dispossession of the indigenous population, discriminatory land legislation and the imposition of apartheid distorted environmental perceptions and attitudes and alienated Black South Africans from the environment issue. According to Mr. Magnus Malan, Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, some R51 million would be needed over the next three decades to combat pollution caused by abandoned coal mines. A President's Council report has underscored the link between the population growth rate and environmental conservation measures. 95/

107. Multi-party negotiators are currently debating the authority of regional governments over sectors such as health, education, housing and local government.

IV. EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA

108. Speaking at the United Nations on 24 September 1993, ANC President Nelson Mandela called for the lifting of all economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa (see paras. 39, 122 and 191). His appeal was followed, on 8 October 1993, by the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 48/1, by which it lifted all economic sanctions against South Africa with immediate effect and the oil embargo as of the date of the entry into effect of TEC. However, the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council remains in effect. Immediately following Mr. Mandela's announcement, the Commonwealth as well as individual countries took steps towards the lifting of economic sanctions (see para. 41).

109. Steps toward normalizing diplomatic, trade and financial relations with South Africa had been taken by a number of countries and intergovernmental organizations prior to the adoption by the General Assembly on 8 October 1993 of resolution 48/1, calling for the lifting of economic sanctions.

A. Diplomatic relations

110. During the period under review, the Government of South Africa continued its efforts to normalize diplomatic relations with the international community. These included initiatives to expand economic relations with other countries and to renew or reactivate its membership in multilateral international bodies. The number of countries lifting sanctions and/or establishing consular, diplomatic or trade relations with South Africa increased steadily during the course of the year.

111. According to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, it was planning to establish missions in 27 countries during 1993-1994. These would include nine missions in the Middle East, six in the Far East and seven in Africa. The Department's report indicates that one of the Government's priorities is to establish economic relations with African countries, particularly those of southern Africa. The Government is also reported to be eager to consolidate South Africa's position in the Far East. Missions had recently been opened in Thailand, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, and "channels of dialogue" had been established with China, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The third area to which the Government was devoting special attention was South Africa's membership and role in the agencies of the United Nations and other international and multilateral organizations. 96/

112. Available reports prior to the call for the lifting of sanctions indicated that a number of countries had established diplomatic relations with South Africa, namely, Albania, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Gabon, Morocco, Norway, Qatar and the Republic of Korea. 97/ Agreements had also been concluded on the opening of representative offices in Oman, Jordan and Zambia 98/ while consular relations had been established with Turkey and Greece. 99/ South Africa opened a representative office in Angola in May 1993, pledging to promote peace and business in that country.

113. South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited several countries during 1993. In January, he visited France to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, making South Africa an original signatory to the Convention, which would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling

and use of chemical weapons and would mandate their destruction. Mr. Botha described the signing of the Convention as a major step forward for the country's standing in the international community. While in Paris, Mr. Botha held meetings with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and United States Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger. He also met with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in London. 100/

114. In April, Mr. Botha travelled to Oman, Qatar and Jordan to explore avenues of trade and cooperation and in May he held meetings with Egyptian officials at Cairo regarding the possibility of establishing diplomatic ties with Egypt and South Africa's membership in OAU. 101/ In March, Mr. Botha met with United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in New York and held talks with United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Washington, D.C.

115. A tripartite meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Angola, Namibia and South Africa was organized on 4 June 1993 by the Namibian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Windhoek to discuss matters of mutual concern. In the joint declaration issued, the three Governments underlined the importance of peace and political stability, economic prosperity and cooperation between the countries of southern Africa. 102/

116. In July, President de Klerk, at the invitation of a civic group called People 2000, travelled to the United States to receive, together with Mr. Nelson Mandela, the Liberty Medal. The medal, which was awarded by President Clinton, also carried a cash award of $100,000 to be shared by the two recipients. Both leaders were acclaimed for initiating a political process that would rid the country of apartheid and usher in a new democratic order. 103/

117. At the invitation of the Lusaka Agricultural and Commercial Show Society, President de Klerk visited Zambia on 30 July to open the society's annual show. He was also received by Zambian President Frederick Chiluba. Mr. de Klerk called for greater economic cooperation between countries of the region and underlined the benefits of a free market economy. 104/

118. In August, accompanied by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Renier Shoeman and a team of South African businessmen, President de Klerk visited Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. Press reports indicate that President de Klerk informed the Governments regarding South Africa's economic plans and the activities of the National Economic Forum, and underlined South Africa's interest in trade and investment possibilities.

119. On 23 September 1993, President de Klerk, accompanied by Foreign Minister Botha, visited the United Nations in New York, the first visit ever made by a South African Head of State. He met with the Secretary-General and later held a press conference. 105/

120. The United Nations, with the sponsorship and funding of the Nordic countries and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany, held an International Seminar on Confidence and Security-building Measures in Southern Africa at Windhoek from 24 to 26 February 1993. The Seminar brought together high-ranking experts in their individual capacity from military, academic, political and government-related areas in the countries of southern Africa, including South Africa. The Seminar provided for an exchange of views on security-related issues in a post-apartheid southern Africa and on possible options for cooperative approaches to security there. The meeting concluded that most of the major security problems in the region were internal/domestic, albeit with potentially dangerous implications for neighbouring States, and that there was a

need to give innovative consideration to confidence and security-building measures of domestic applicability in the military sphere. High on such an agenda would be measures relating to civil-military relations and the integration of government forces and non-governmental armed formations. It was suggested that a regional workshop should be organized on that very urgent question.

121. In line with South Africa's announcement in 1992 that it would adhere to all mandatory Security Council regulations, including sanctions, the Government of South Africa decided to support the United Nations economic embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This represented a departure from its earlier position that sanctions were not an effective measure as they hurt the very persons they sought to protect. Furthermore, on 29 January 1993, the Government of South Africa signed the following United Nations conventions: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women and the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. South Africa has acceded to the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages.

B. Trade and finance

122. Owing to the gradual lifting of sanctions by a number of countries and international business relations becoming normalized, the number of trade missions to and from South Africa greatly increased during the year under review. Although political and economic relations with several Governments may have been on hold prior to Mr. Mandela's call for the lifting of all economic sanctions on 24 September 1993 (see paras. 39, 108 and 191), several South African businesses have taken initiatives to restore links with trade partners, around the world. The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry has announced the adoption of a three-pronged approach, which aims at re-establishing and expanding trade relations with traditional trading partners, mainly the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Western Europe; creating new markets in the economically buoyant regions of the Pacific Rim; and expanding and creating links with African countries. In 1990, 12 trade missions visited South Africa. As overseas curiosity and business interest took firmer hold, the number of missions increased to 45 in 1991 and soared to at least 160 in 1992, with a bigger increase expected for 1993. 106/

1. Trade fairs

123. South Africa participated in and hosted a number of international trade fairs during the period under review. The German Technological Trade Fair '93, held in March 1993, was the first official German exhibition organized in South Africa since the European Community (EC) imposed sanctions in 1986 and it brought 144 exporters to South Africa. 107/ The first trade fair with China, held from 19 to 25 April at Johannesburg, brought some 80 Chinese enterprises, including shipbuilding, petrochemicals, metallurgy and non-ferrous metals, to South Africa. 108/ Sixty-seven countries are reported to have booked stands for the first South African International Trade Exhibition (SALTEX), to be held at Johannesburg towards the end of 1993. 109/ According to the South African Foreign Trade Organization, $250 million worth of orders were obtained by South African businesses during the trade exhibition in Dubai in October 1992. A South Africa trade exhibition supported by seminars and a tourism programme was

held in Singapore from 13 August to 3 September 1993. 110/ Forty-eight South African companies participated in the Lusaka Agricultural and Commercial Society Show, held at Lusaka in August 1993. During the same month, Thailand opened its first trade fair in Africa at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park, with more than 50 Thai exhibitors taking part. 111/ Official business delegations, including cabinet ministers from 24 African States, participated in the Africa Initiative: Johannesburg-Africa Business Week from 30 August to 3 September. The event provided a forum for African leaders to meet on issues such as project, market, trade and product development for Africa. 112/

2. Import/exports

124. The backbone of the South African export economy remains the mining and agricultural sector. Export income is dominated by precious metals, base metals and minerals, which together still account for about 80 per cent of revenue. South Africa has 44 per cent of the world's known reserves of gold and 24 per cent of the world's diamonds. It accounts for 82 per cent of manganese ore reserves, 69 per cent of platinum group metals and 56 per cent of chrome ore, along with other major reserves. 110/

125. The serious drought of 1992 obliged South Africa to import large quantities of maize and wheat instead of being a net exporter, especially of maize, which has traditionally been an important earner of foreign exchange. The South African Agricultural Union expects the maize crop to reach 8 million tons in 1993, representing a massive improvement compared to the low yield of approximately 2.5 million tons in 1992. In order to meet domestic needs, South Africa needs to harvest about 6 to 6.5 million tons of maize per annum. Wheat production was, however, badly hit by a severe crop failure in the Orange Free State. Deciduous fruit produce, which has become one of South Africa's major exports, is expected to drop slightly for the first time in a decade owing to extraordinarily hot weather in the Cape from December 1992 to January 1993. However, overall agricultural production improved markedly compared to 1992, in particular because of the bountiful harvest in maize. 113/

126. Exports in the first six months of 1993, totalling R3.69 billion, were 11 per cent higher than those recorded for the same period in 1992, while imports, totalling R2.76 billion, were up by 14 per cent. The trade surplus in June 1993 was R2.36 billion, compared with the May figure of R1.87 billion. Economists attributed the improved export performance in June to the depreciation of the rand, the higher dollar price of gold and increased diamond sales. 114/

127. Turkey's ERN Group and South Africa's Allied Coal signed an agreement that would net South Africa almost R100 million and further boost the coal industry. The deal would allow the export to Turkey of a minimum of 650,000 tons of coal, with an option to increase the figure to 850,000 tons. The agreement followed reports that Germany, Denmark and Israel had also finalized agreements for the purchase of coal from South African suppliers. The South African fruit producers are reportedly looking closely at the possibility of exporting South African fruit to Turkey. 115/

3. Loans and credits

128. Under an arrangement concluded with its creditor banks, South Africa would repay $5 billion of its foreign debt over eight years starting in January 1994.

The debt was due for repayment at the end of 1993. A debt standstill arose in September 1985 when South Africa defaulted on the repayment of $13.6 billion of foreign debt, which was over half of its total outstanding foreign debt at that time. The main terms of the 1994 debt arrangement are that it will run until 15 August 2001, with an initial payment of 10 per cent ($500 million) and the balance payable in 15 half-year instalments. The debt arrangement has been endorsed by the main political forces in South Africa. This was in response to the demands of creditors who said that, unlike previous arrangements, which were of a purely technical nature, the present agreement required political consensus. The arrangement is expected to improve the country's credit rating in international capital markets and to assist negotiations on new loans. South Africa's total foreign debt was $17.2 billion at the end of 1992, or 15 per cent of GDP. 116/

129. The Government's gold and foreign exchange reserves dropped by more than R6 billion in the 10 months leading up to June 1993, owing primarily to foreign capital outflows. The outflows were in part politically related, with foreign creditor banks reportedly unwilling to roll over maturing loans except at punitive rates. Major parastatal entities have elected to repay the loans, causing an outflow of long-term capital. Short-term capital outflows, however, were considered to be the main reason for the outflow of capital. 117/

4. Trade policy

130. In an effort to liberalize trade, South Africa is offering to bind up to 55 per cent of its tariff lines to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This would mean that the average tariff for industrial products would decline by one third and there would be a 5 per cent increase in duty-free tariff lines to 25 per cent. 110/ GATT membership would give South Africa access, as a most favoured nation, to more than 100 countries and could be the country's most important trade policy instrument in the immediate future. GATT has asked South Africa to implement certain economic reforms more rapidly, undertake autonomous trade liberalization and improve its tariff policy. 118/ A proposal developed by the Department of Trade and Industry and approved by the National Economic Forum is to be submitted to the Uruguay Round on global trade talks to be held before the end of 1993. 119/

131. As sanctions are being lifted, South Africa has come under increasing international pressure to discontinue its unwieldy and sometimes inconsistent trade policies. Studies and reports have shown over the years that South Africa's high level of protection, or so-called "anti-export bias", hurts exports, retards economic growth, adds to unemployment and, finally, makes the country poorer. 120/

5. Foreign investment

132. Foreign investment was reported to be at its lowest level in more than 30 years (15.9 per cent of GDP) with capital pouring out of the country at the rate of 2.8 per cent of GDP between 1985 and 1992. The resumption of foreign investment is considered crucial to sustained recovery. South African economists are looking forward to renewed access to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank once agreement is reached in constitutional negotiations. 121/

133. ANC has called on South African businesses to join forces in developing a strategy for foreign investment, to be presented later in 1993. A joint committee was suggested to be "a platform to market South Africa as an investment destination". 122/ A report issued by the National Economic Forum laid out some guidelines for foreign direct investment. In what appeared to represent a real compromise among the three main groups (business, labour, Government), it was proposed that tax incentives or more relaxed labour legislation should not be granted foreign firms. Instead, reasonably low and stable corporate tax rates should apply and all firms should operate under the same labour laws. A broad range of incentives developed under a coherent industrial policy should apply equally to foreign and local investors. All parties felt that low business confidence was deterring both foreign and domestic investment, and that foreign investors looked to domestic investors for the signal to invest. It was therefore necessary to create an economic climate that encouraged and stimulated domestic investment. 123/

134. Investment in new industrial plants and the manufacture of machinery continued to lag, owing to low investor confidence because of the continued violence and political uncertainty. 124/

6. Tourism

135. Despite the violence and unrest, South Africa was able to register a 7.4 per cent growth in overseas tourist arrivals in 1992 as compared with 1991, according to the Ministry of Tourism. However, this was a long way from the 20 per cent growth hoped for. 125/ According to a survey of the southern African tourism industry, violence in the second half of 1992 cost the tourism industry about R200 million in lost revenue. Some 3,000 to 4,000 job opportunities had been forfeited as well. According to a spokesperson for the tourist industry, events such as the murder of Chris Hani and the massacre at St. James' Church (see paras. 48 and 50) had done particular damage to tourism. There was a 25 per cent increase in hotel cancellations after the assassination of Mr. Hani in April 1993.

136. Altogether, tourism earned R10.4 billion in 1992, equal to 3.2 per cent of GNP. The tourism industry currently employs more than 300,000 people and if it grows as expected it would require an additional 450,000 workers by the year 2000. Tourism accounts for only about 2 per cent of South Africa's GDP compared with an international average of 6 per cent, demonstrating an enormous potential for growth. About 60 per cent of income from tourism was generated by domestic tourists. 126/ Since 1991 the number of airlines serving South Africa nearly doubled, from 26 to 44, and the total number of airline seats on international long haul flights from South Africa increased from 18,500 to 27,700 a week, an increase of over 60 per cent. 127/

C. Military matters

1. Defence expenditure

137. South Africa, which has the fifth largest arms industry in the world, is reported to have reduced its defence expenditure since 1989 from 4.3 per cent to 2.6 per cent of GDP. 128/ Its 1993-1994 budget was further reduced to R9.3 billion, a 3.8 per cent decrease from the previous budget of R9.7 billion. The South African military is reported to have embarked on a drastic rationalization and cost-cutting programme to be implemented over the next few

years. A significant reduction of staff and closing of bases is expected. Nearly 6,000 SADF members were retrenched in 1992. However, while the end of the war in Namibia lessened the need for heavy and sophisticated weaponry, it has allowed for the deployment since 1990 of more SADF members to assist SAP than had ever been deployed in Namibia and Angola, currently about 10,000. 129/

138. In February 1993, the South African Parliament was informed that SADF had a R4.38 billion budget for its secret special defence account. In a statement expressing its deep concern, ANC stated:

> "Such expenditure on covert projects by a discredited defence force, which even the State President had to acknowledge harbours in its ranks senior officers and whole units that were undermining - and are probably still trying to undermine - South Africa's transition to democracy, is a very serious matter." 130/

PAC has underlined its concern that the special defence account used for secret operations was not subject to audit and that some of it was being used to foment the violence in which thousands of South Africans had lost their lives. The South African military has reported that military intelligence spending had been sharply reduced. R4.2 billion ($1.35 billion) was used in 1992 for weapons purchases and about R200 million ($65 million) for "intelligence agencies and special defence activities". 131/ However, only 2 per cent savings had been achieved so far in the special defence account as compared with the 5 per cent cuts made in the rest of the defence force.

139. The South African Arms Corporation (ARMSCOR) was established 20 years ago to counter the United Nations mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. The Armaments Development and Production Act No. 57 of 1968, as amended, stipulated that ARMSCOR had the mandate and authority to provide all of South Africa's armament requirements as determined by the Minister of Defence. With the present decline in armament requirements, ARMSCOR is reported to have begun a partial conversion of its production to include civilian products. ARMSCOR, having two basic functions as at 1 April 1992, namely, acquisition and manufacture, would also grant permits for the export of armaments and would market surplus SADF equipment abroad. In efforts towards greater transparency and more accountability, ARMSCOR released, for the first time, an annual report on its activities to the general public for the period 1992-1993. 132/ DENEL, ARMSCOR's privatized wing, was reported to have a total revenue of R2.818 billion during its first year, 1992-1993, from which a dividend of R60 million would be paid to the State. R54.3 million had been provided for income tax payments. 133/

2. South Africa's imports of arms and equipment

140. The Special Committee against Apartheid issued a statement 134/ on 10 December 1992 expressing concern regarding the R520 million agreement between the South African authorities and the Swiss manufacturer of Pilatus PC-7 trainer aircraft, and called on all States to observe strictly the mandatory embargo on the provision of arms and related material to South Africa in accordance with Security Council resolution 418 (1977). On 29 December 1992, the Security Council issued a statement requesting the Swiss authorities to take the necessary measures to prevent the sale. 135/

141. Protests and appeals were also directed to the Government of Switzerland by organizations such as the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear

Collaboration with South Africa and the South African Council of Churches. However, the Government of Switzerland announced on 1 June 1993 that it had decided to give its approval for the export of 60 Pilatus PC-7 military trainer aircraft to the SAAF. It stated that it was satisfied that technical changes to be made by the manufacturer, Oerlikon Buhrle (a Pilatus subsidiary), would make it impossible to convert the aircraft for combat use. It also announced that it would grant an export credit guarantee to support the SwF 250 million order. 136/ On 27 May and 2 June 1993, The Star (Johannesburg) reported that ANC had informed the Government of Switzerland that it was not fundamentally opposed to the sale but insisted that the aircraft be delivered only after the South African elections in 1994.

142. On 19 February 1993, Business Day (Johannesburg) reported that then Defence Minister Gene Louw had announced the South African Navy's decision to purchase a Russian Arctic supply vessel, the Juvent, for R41 million to replace the 35-year-old replenishment ship, the SAS Tafelberg. A ministry spokesperson stated that the Juvent, although fitted with a helicopter deck, was an ordinary vessel and was not equipped with military hardware. The 2,100-ton ship, which was built in 1991 in Ukraine, was sold by Akva Ltd., Moscow.

143. According to a report published in The Citizen (Johannesburg) on 15 January 1993, ANC stated that SADF planned to purchase a R5 million press for the printing of classified material. ANC called on international suppliers to refrain from concluding the deal, as the sale would, in its view, be in contravention of the arms embargo against South Africa.

3. Export of arms and ammunition from South Africa

144. ARMSCOR held a six-day armaments fair, the Defence Exposition of South Africa (DEXSA '92), at Nasrec, south of Johannesburg, from 16 to 21 November 1992, with more than 150 South African companies participating and displaying their products. The Special Committee against Apartheid called on all Governments and other institutions not to support ARMSCOR's armaments exhibition. 137/ According to ARMSCOR chief executive Tielman de Waal, more than 200 officials from 46 countries had been invited, but an even larger number had come of their own accord. The exposition evoked considerable interest, particularly in Africa, the Middle and Far East, and in South America. Opposing the exhibition, the Black Sash organization stated that R11 million a day of taxpayers' money was spent on arms purchases by the South African military, which could serve more than 60 million meals to hungry people. 138/

145. In its 5-11 March 1993 issue, The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg) reported that ARMSCOR's privatized wing, DENEL, sold R18 million worth of arms and ammunition, including bombs, mortars and hand grenades, to the Government of Rwanda during 1992.

146. According to reports published in Business Day (Johannesburg) on 18 February and in Anti-Apartheid News (London) in its February/March 1993 issue, at least 15 South African arms-producing companies participated in the International Defence Exhibition in the United Arab Emirates from 14 to 18 February 1993.

147. On 9 July 1993, Southscan (London) reported that at a regional security conference held at Harare in July 1993, the South African Defence Minister, Kobie Coetsee, said that the South African arms industry was already supplying 16 African countries with arms, bringing in R100 million in 1992.

148. According to reports from Jane's Defence Weekly (London) of 30 January and Business Day (Johannesburg) of 19 February 1993, a high-tech mobile anti-aircraft system, adapted and improved by ARMSCOR from Soviet equipment captured in Angola, was being successfully marketed world wide. ARMSCOR's subsidiary, DENEL, manufactured the ammunition for the anti-aircraft weapon. ARMSCOR was also providing a back-up computer-generated simulator training system.

149. In December 1992, a federal grand jury in Philadelphia (United States of America) found Thomas Jasin, executive of the now-defunct International Signal and Control Corporation, guilty of conspiring to sell South African missiles to China during the mid-1980s. The jury acquitted him of a second charge involving the illegal export of sophisticated military electronics to South Africa. The deal, which involved smuggling Striker anti-tank missiles into the United States for testing, was part of a joint attempt by ARMSCOR and the Corporation to sell the missile to China. 139/

150. The Citizen (Johannesburg) of 18 June 1993 reported that Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes had stated in Parliament that South African arms were transported from South Africa to Zaire by Russian pilots and aircraft, in spite of measures taken by South Africa to stop such arms exports. 140/

151. The Star (Johannesburg) of 7 June 1993 reported that the Hummingbird, South Africa's latest entry into the aviation market, was introduced at the Paris Air Show in June 1993. Designed and developed by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the two-seater plane, which can take off and land over relatively short distances, was described as a "slow-speed daytime observations aircraft".

4. Aerospace and nuclear issues

152. On 14 January 1993, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris, making South Africa an original signatory (see para. 113). In his statement at the signing, Mr. Botha said:

> "South Africa has already acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We are also a party to the Biological Weapons Convention. In addition, South Africa is prepared to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime and, with the approval of other countries, to become a member. The world therefore knows that South Africa fully accepts its global and regional responsibilities and is committed to non-proliferation and disarmament." 141/

153. The Washington Post of 18 March 1993 reported that prior to South Africa's pledge in 1991 to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United States intelligence had confidential information that South Africa had secretly developed a nuclear arsenal of perhaps 6 to 10 warheads during the 1970s and early 1980s, and had produced and stockpiled enough highly enriched uranium for 12 to 24 nuclear weapons.

154. In a speech to the joint session of the Tricameral Parliament on 24 March 1993, President de Klerk confirmed that over a 15-year period South Africa had succeeded in building six nuclear fission devices and had been at work on a seventh, when it decided to dismantle its arsenal in 1989. President de Klerk stated that the decision to develop a "limited nuclear

deterrent capability" was taken in 1974 "against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat in southern Africa, as well as prevailing uncertainty concerning the designs of the Warsaw Pact members". The "build-up of Cuban troops in Angola from 1975 onwards reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary, as did South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance, should it be attacked". President de Klerk underlined that "it was never the intention to use the devices and from the outset the emphasis was on deterrence". Instead, the strategy was that "if the situation in Southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability would be given to one or more of the major Powers, for example the United States, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene". The devices were of the gun type, to be fuelled with highly enriched uranium; their components were stored separately in steel vaults and they were never stockpiled in assembled form. 142/ The Government of South Africa had, in 1989, decided that all existing nuclear devices should be dismantled or destroyed; that all the nuclear material in ARMSCOR's possession should be recast (into metal ingots unsuitable for explosive use) and returned to the Atomic Energy Commission, where it should be stored according to internationally accepted measures; that ARMSCOR's facilities should be decontaminated and used only for non-nuclear commercial purposes; and that South Africa, following this, would accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and submit all its nuclear materials and facilities to international safeguards. President de Klerk also said in his statement to Parliament, that he wished to confirm unequivocally that South Africa was adhering strictly to the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that it would continue to do so. 143/

155. In his speech to Parliament, President de Klerk stated that South Africa had at no time acquired nuclear weapon technology or materials from another country, nor had it provided any to any other country, or cooperated with another country in that regard.

156. The Government of South Africa disclosed that the cost of the nuclear weapon programme had been R800 million ($250 million), but some observers estimate that the real cost was 10 times that figure. 144/

157. President de Klerk told Parliament that the decision to make this disclosure had been prompted by continued suspicions that, despite South Africa's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991, not all nuclear materials had been declared to IAEA and consequently not subjected to the IAEA verification in 1992 of South Africa's declared inventory of nuclear material and facilities. This had been harming South Africa's commercial nuclear programme. According to The Guardian (London) of 25 March 1993, the Government of South Africa had decided to scrap the programme as the cold war was ending and agreement had been reached for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, concluding that a nuclear deterrent had become "an obstacle to the development of South Africa's international relations". On 26 March 1993, the Christian Science Monitor (Boston) reported that the disclosures had defused long-standing international concerns that South Africa's nuclear capability could be transferred to hostile States.

158. According to the PPNN Newsbrief in its second quarter 1993 report, research work had started in 1971 on a "peaceful nuclear explosive" for the mining industry. Most of the work on the weapons had been conducted at the Advena Laboratory, some 25 miles west of Pretoria. Two shafts, each roughly 200 metres deep, had been dug at a remote site in the Kalahari Desert for a potential underground nuclear test. 145/ An attempt to test the non-nuclear components of the device with a dummy core at the Kalahari test site was reported to have been

discovered by satellite and discontinued under diplomatic pressure from the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 146/ IAEA had supervised the filling-in of the underground nuclear test shafts in 1993. 147/

159. While South Africa claims it has produced only 880 pounds (400 kilograms) of enriched uranium, some United States intelligence experts said they believed that it might have produced three times that amount if the enrichment facility in Valindaba, which has since been closed down, had a full operative capacity, and that the records may have been changed. The PPNN Newsbrief reports that there were rumours that material might have been exported, to Israel, among others, and that some was hidden.

160. Pursuant to South Africa's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards agreement with IAEA, the Agency had started to verify the completeness and correctness of the inventory of South Africa's nuclear installations and material. After the announcement in March 1993 that South Africa had produced a number of nuclear weapons before the safeguards agreement with IAEA entered into force and that the nuclear material derived from them had been fully included in South Africa's initial report to IAEA of 1991, an IAEA team, assisted by nuclear weapon experts, undertook additional activities with the purpose of assessing that the nuclear weapon programme had been terminated and gaining assurance that all the nuclear material used in the programme had been accounted for and was under IAEA safeguards. 148/

161. In its report on the above activities, IAEA stated that the findings from the team's examination of records, facilities and remaining non-nuclear components of the dismantled/destroyed nuclear weapons and from the team's evaluation of the amount of highly enriched uranium produced by the pilot enrichment plant were consistent with the declared scope of the nuclear weapon programme. The team found no indication to suggest that there remained any sensitive components of the nuclear weapon programme that had not been either rendered useless or converted to commercial non-nuclear applications or peaceful nuclear usage. The report went on to state that in the future, and without prejudice to the Agency's rights under safeguards agreement, the Agency planned to utilize the standing invitation of the Government of South Africa, under its reiterated policy of transparency, to provide the Agency with full access to any location or facility associated with the former nuclear weapon programme and to request access on case-by-case basis to other locations or facilities that the Agency might specifically wish to visit (A/48/339).

162. During his visit in Washington, D.C., in July 1993, Atomic Energy Corporation chief executive officer Mr. Waldo Stumpf told United States officials and nuclear experts that South Africa intended to keep its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to produce industrial and medical isotopes, using the Safari research reactor. The Atomic Energy Corporation believed it could use its highly enriched uranium to generate revenues of up to R500 million over the next decade from the isotopes and other related commercial products. South Africa could not have expected to receive more than R15 million for the highly enriched uranium as such if it were sold to the United States. The market was glutted, as Russia and the United States had dismantled large parts of their nuclear arsenals. Mr. Stumpf also said he hoped to allay lingering United States concerns that South Africa had not fully accounted for its highly enriched uranium stockpile and still posed a proliferation threat. He added that South Africa was completely within its rights to keep its highly enriched uranium and it was now all declared and under IAEA safeguards. 149/

163. The New York Times of 25 March 1993 reported that under heavy pressure from the United States Government, the South African Cabinet had agreed to scrap its plans to build a new long-range, solid-fuel rocket. The United States Government had argued that the missile could be put to military use or sold to other countries that could use it to deliver warheads. According to Southscan (London) of 9 July 1993, South Africa was hoping, in return, for cooperation with the United States on space projects. A joint working group had been set up to assess possible areas of cooperation, with the focus on satellite development. The DENEL Corporation has said it would go ahead with its low-orbit satellite and ground station programme. South Africa's recently announced Greensat low-orbit satellite was exhibited at the Paris Air Show in June 1993 and has attracted international interest. The Greensat could be used for geological surveys, environmental management and natural disaster assessments.

164. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 47/76 of 15 December 1992, a group of experts designated by the United Nations in cooperation with OAU, organized a three-day workshop at Harare from 5 to 8 April 1993, in order to draw up a draft treaty or convention on the denuclearization of Africa. Representatives from 23 African States attended the meeting and discussed ways of making Africa a zone free of nuclear weapons. South African delegates at the workshop viewed it as the start of the process of South Africa's becoming part of the technological arena in Africa. In their report, the experts agreed to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with OAU, to convene a further meeting of the group of experts, in order to enable it to finalize the drafting of a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. 150/

165. In concluding its thirty-seventh regular session on 1 October 1993, the General Conference of IAEA adopted a resolution by acclamation on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. In recognizing that the full disclosure of South Africa's nuclear facilities and materials was a contributing factor to the region's peace and security and to current efforts for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the resolution specifically requests South Africa to continue its "stated policy of full transparency". 151/

V. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

166. During the period under review, developments in South Africa remained a focus of attention of the international community, which continued to monitor those developments closely and welcomed the resumption of multi-party negotiations in March 1993 and subsequent understandings and agreements reached within that process. The United Nations and other international and regional organizations as well as individual Governments have also been ready to assist and facilitate the negotiation process.

167. The trend towards the relaxation of restrictive measures, in particular in trade, sports and cultural activities, continued. However, the persistent levels of political violence and the threat posed by particular groups and formations to the negotiating process seem to a large extent to have postponed a normalization of relations with South Africa. International, regional and other organizations as well as Governments increased assistance for the implementation of activities and programmes facilitating the negotiating process, fostering reconciliation and addressing the socio-economic inequalities in the disadvantaged sectors during the transitional period.

A. United Nations action

168. The greater involvement by the international community in facilitating the transition to a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa was emphasized particularly in resolutions 765 (1992) and 772 (1992), adopted unanimously by the Security Council. The importance of such an involvement was further underscored by the appointment and subsequent missions of special envoys dispatched to South Africa by the Secretary-General and by the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa in September 1992.

169. Since that time some 50 United Nations observers have been working in coordination with the structures established under the National Peace Accord effectively to address the areas of concern underlined by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council of 22 December 1992 152/ and to facilitate South Africa's transition to democracy. The Government and the parties concerned have welcomed the presence and contribution of the observers, who are fulfilling the mandate entrusted to them in close cooperation with observers from the Commonwealth Secretariat, EC and OAU.

170. The personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa observe demonstrations, marches and other forms of mass action, as well as the conduct of political parties and the security forces, and determine whether the activities observed are consistent with the principles of the National Peace Accord and the guidelines for marches and political gatherings worked out by the Goldstone Commission in consultation with various parties. They examine and report to the Secretary-General on areas of concern, specially related to the ongoing political violence in the country, public actions, the conduct of political parties, security forces and other armed formations, hostels, the public display of dangerous weapons and investigations and prosecutions of criminal conduct. 153/

171. The observers have established contacts at all levels with government and administrative structures, political parties, community-based "alternative structures" such as civic associations, non-governmental organizations and other groups. They take initiatives to ease political tension, facilitate dispute

resolution and provide support to community projects aimed at promoting political tolerance and dialogue within communities. 154/

172. In addition, the Secretary-General designated two Special Envoys to carry out separate fact-finding missions to South Africa: Mr. Virendra Dayal visited South Africa from 16 to 27 September and Ambassador Tom Vraalsen from 22 November to 9 December 1992. 155/

173. During the course of their respective visits, the Special Envoys held discussions with all political leaders regarding the status of negotiations, programmes being implemented under the National Peace Accord, the status of the return of refugees and the areas of concern identified by the Secretary-General in his report of 7 August 1992 to the Security Council 156/ and by Council resolution 772 (1992); namely, the ongoing violence; investigations and prosecutions of criminal activity; efforts at police reform; investigations into the security forces and other armed formations; the status of Battalions 31 and 32 and the Koevoet Battalion; the question of hostels; and the question of public display of dangerous weapons. 157/

174. In his report to the Security Council of 22 December 1992, 152/ the Secretary-General called on all parties to recognize that continued uncertainty over the country's future would only lead to further violence, instability and economic decline. He underlined that the principle of inclusiveness must be recognized as essential for a transition to democratic rule through free elections and new constitutional arrangements. Furthermore, the Secretary-General called on all political leaders to take immediate action to curb political violence while recognizing that the Government of South Africa had primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. 158/

175. In response to the unprecedented upsurge in violence during July and August 1993, specially in the area of the East Rand, on 24 August 1993 the President of the Security Council issued a statement on behalf of its members calling on all parties in South Africa to assist the Government in preventing opponents of democracy from using violence to threaten the country's democratic transition. In that regard, the Council noted the proposal for a national peace force to restore and maintain order in volatile areas. The Security Council underlined that any such force must be genuinely representative of South African society and its major political bodies and, just as importantly, that it must have the confidence, support and cooperation of the people of South Africa. 159/

176. The Council emphasized the key role of the multi-party negotiating process in securing the transition to a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa and urged the parties to reaffirm their commitment to that process, to redouble their efforts to reach consensus on transitional arrangements and constitutional issues still outstanding and to proceed to elections as planned in the coming year.

177. On 23 September 1993, the Secretary-General met with President de Klerk at the United Nations and congratulated him on the historic decision adopted by the South African Parliament on the establishment of TEC and assured him that the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa would be strengthened in the months ahead leading up to the holding of free, democratic elections to a non-racial constituent assembly in April 1994. 160/ On 9 October 1993, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the President of the Security Council requesting the Council to authorize the increase of the number of observers by 40 for a total complement of 100 to reinforce security and stability in the country during the transitional period. 161/

178. The General Assembly considered the agenda item entitled "Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa" from 17 to 19 November 1992 and on 18 December 1992 adopted resolutions 47/116 A to G on the subject.

179. Reflecting a significant change in the General Assembly's consideration of the agenda item, there was less stress on pressure and sanctions and more emphasis on support for the process of political change, and on the responsibilities of the political and all other interested parties in South Africa to bring about a peaceful transition to a non-racial South Africa. The Assembly underscored its broad-based support for the political process by adopting by consensus, for the third year, an omnibus resolution, section A of which was entitled "International efforts towards the total eradication of apartheid and support for the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa". In resolution 47/116 A the Assembly strongly urged the South African authorities to exercise the primary responsibility of government to bring to an end the ongoing violence; called on all parties to cooperate in combating the violence and to resume broad-based negotiations on transitional arrangements; commended the Secretary-General for the deployment of United Nations observers in South Africa; and appealed to the international community to help create stable conditions for the rapid and peaceful attainment of a new South Africa based on an agreed, democratic and non-racial constitution by providing material and financial assistance so that the serious socio-economic problems of the people could be addressed.

180. Also, in recognition of the qualitative change reflected in the work and direction of the Special Committee, the General Assembly adopted, for the first time by consensus, the resolution on the programme of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid (resolution 47/116 B). Resolution 47/116 C, entitled "United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa", in which the Assembly called for continued humanitarian and legal assistance to victims of repression and former political prisoners, and resolution 47/117, entitled "United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa", in which the Assembly welcomed the expanding educational and training activities of the Programme inside South Africa, were also adopted on 18 December 1992 without a vote.

181. Other texts adopted on the same date were resolutions 47/116 D, "Oil embargo against South Africa"; 47/116 E, "Military and other collaboration with South Africa"; 47/116 F, "Relations between South Africa and Israel"; and 47/116 G, "Support for the work of the Commission against Apartheid in Sports".

182. Other United Nations offices and agencies have continued to monitor the evolving political process in South Africa with increased attention and have initiated studies in preparation for programmes to provide, at the appropriate time, a concerted system-wide response to address the socio-economic disparities that will continue in vital sectors such as education, health, housing and employment.

183. In accordance with the terms of the agreement reached with the Government of South Africa in September 1991, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that it had registered 10,957 South African refugees and exiles by the end of May 1993. The Government of South Africa had cleared a total of 10,730 persons and 6,604 individuals had returned to South Africa under the auspices of UNHCR, which also provides repatriation assistance to the returnees. Member States and regional and other organizations contributed over $27 million in support of the repatriation and reintegration effort, which has included small-scale income-generation training programmes for returnees. 162/

184. In its Declaration against Apartheid adopted at the 80th International Labour Conference, held in June 1993, the International Labour Organization (ILO) welcomed recent political developments in South Africa, requested the Director-General to report to the Governing Body on progress made towards the elimination of apartheid, including the establishment of TEC and other measures taken towards the holding of general elections, and requested the Governing Body, if it was satisfied that conditions existed that would warrant a reconsideration of ILO action against apartheid, to put an item on the agenda of the 1994 ILO Conference concerning the review of the Declaration. 163/

185. In February 1993, ILO dispatched an interdisciplinary planning mission to assess the needs for technical cooperation and assistance and met with representatives of South African employers' and employees' organizations. The findings of the mission are to be used to design a programme of action to be implemented in priority areas, such as employment creation, human resource development, economic policy, worker education and training, and reform of labour legislation. ILO has also assisted and participated in training workshops for non-racial civil organizations. 164/

186. In December 1992, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) attached a small team of professional staff to the UNHCR office in South Africa under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of South Africa and UNHCR. In cooperation with UNHCR and the National Children's Rights Committee, UNICEF is assessing the needs of women and children, with particular emphasis on the resettlement of returnees and the victims of violence and other internally displaced people. UNICEF has assisted in the completion of two recently published studies, the "State of South Africa's Children" and "Children and Women in South Africa: A Situation Analysis". 165/

187. On 16 July 1993, the United Nations and the Commonwealth Secretariat announced plans to convene jointly an International Donors' Conference on Human Resource Development for Post-Apartheid South Africa. The main objective of the Conference would be to stimulate interest among donor countries and other donor agencies in addressing the human resource development needs of a post-apartheid South Africa, particularly those of the disadvantaged sectors of society. International organizations, bilateral aid agencies, non-governmental organizations and South African political, community, professional and grass-roots bodies would be invited to the Conference. Preparations will be made in consultation with TEC. The Conference is scheduled to be held after the April 1994 elections. 166/

B. Intergovernmental organizations

188. An OAU fact-finding mission of experts visited South Africa from 14 September to 3 October in order to determine the possible contributions of OAU in ending the violence and facilitating the negotiating process. 167/ Subsequent to the report of the fact-finding mission, the Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa of OAU met at Gabarone on 15 October 1992 and decided to deploy an observer mission in South Africa. The OAU observer mission, led by Mr. Legwaila J. Legwaila (Botswana), was mandated to examine, within the context of Security Council resolution 772 (1992), the issue of violence in South Africa, and to work in coordination with the structures established under the National Peace Accord and members of the observer teams of the United Nations, EEC and the Commonwealth Secretariat, and to assist in assuring an atmosphere of political tolerance for the negotiating process to continue.

189. At the OAU Council of Ministers session at Cairo from 21 to 26 June 1993, the ongoing negotiating process in South Africa dominated the discussions. Grave concern was expressed regarding the escalating violence, the assassination of political leaders such as Mr. Chris Hani and the recent formation of a right-wing front opposed to the peaceful settlement in South Africa. The Council was of the view that any further delay in reaching agreement on transitional arrangements would further exacerbate the polarization afflicting the country and it called on all relevant parties to speed up the negotiating process. The Council of Ministers adopted a resolution welcoming the agreement reached in the multi-party negotiating framework on the date for democratic elections for a constituent assembly, called upon the international community to maintain its pressure on the Government of South Africa in all important areas, including arms, nuclear and oil embargoes, and decided to set up a special fund for elections in South Africa to assist the liberation movements to mobilize and ensure the widest possible participation in the elections. 168/

190. In May 1993, the South African Foreign Minister made an official visit to Egypt to explore the possibility of the membership of South Africa in OAU. Press reports indicate that OAU would give consideration to the matter subsequent to further progress in the negotiations, including the setting up of a transitional Government. 169/

191. Following Mr. Mandela's call for the lifting of economic sanctions in his address to the Special Committee against Apartheid on 24 September 1993, the Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa of OAU met in extraordinary ministerial session on 29 September 1993 in New York to review the situation in South Africa in the light of the most recent developments in the peace process, and was briefed by Mr. Mandela and the Secretary-General of PAC. The Committee, while recognizing that there existed a difference between the two liberation movements, ANC and PAC, on the timing of the lifting of sanctions, issued a statement in support of the lifting of economic sanctions against South Africa with the exception of those relating to the arms embargo and nuclear matters. The Committee urged that the oil embargo be lifted after the establishment and commencement of the work of TEC. The Committee expressed its support for the establishment or restoration of full diplomatic relations with South Africa subsequent to the installation of an interim Government of national unity, following the elections to be held on 27 April 1994. 170/

192. Following the lifting of restrictive measures in the cultural, scientific and sporting fields during 1992, EEC increased informal links through meetings, conferences, fact-finding missions and the placement of observers in South Africa. Representatives of the Community met with South African government officials and representatives of political parties and non-governmental organizations, among others, in order to discuss future relations between the Community and the new South Africa. The Community had stated that the formal initiation of diplomatic relations between it and South Africa would be dependent on steady progress in the negotiating process and the establishment of an interim Government. The embargo on imports and exports of arms and sensitive goods for the armed forces, along with measures affecting military and nuclear cooperation, remained in effect. 171/

193. On 25 September 1993, the Community and its member States issued a declaration in which they welcomed recent events in South Africa that had enabled Mr. Mandela to call for the lifting of all economic sanctions still in force vis-à-vis South Africa and noted with satisfaction that other important partners had recently announced the lifting of economic sanctions still in place, as the Community and its member States had already done. The declaration

also stated that the Community would soon be considering further steps towards normalizing relations with South Africa concurrently with developments towards majority rule in the country (see A/48/454, annex).

194. The 15-member EEC observer mission in South Africa and EC experts working with the Goldstone Commission are working in close cooperation with other international observers in monitoring the ongoing political process and in efforts to reduce the violence, increase political tolerance and conflict resolution, as well as providing assistance to victims of violence.

195. EEC has channelled a large and growing special programme of assistance through South African non-governmental organizations to address the needs in sectors such as education and training, health, rural and agricultural development, community development, voter education and media programmes. The Community is the largest single overseas aid donor to South Africa and has since 1985 supported over 500 projects at a cost of almost R1 billion (ECU 250 million). 172/ Combined with bilateral assistance by individual member States, such programmes make up well over 50 per cent of all external development assistance received by South Africa. EEC assistance to South Africa for 1993 is reported to be ECU 90 million (R341 million). 173/

196. On 24 September 1993, Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka Anyaoku announced the immediate lifting of all trade, investment and financial sanctions in response to the adoption of the bill by the South African Parliament establishing TEC. 174/ The 17-member Commonwealth observer mission, deployed in South Africa since October 1992, includes lawyers, police officers, experts in negotiation, a judge and military specialists, and is based in Johannesburg and Durban. The team in Johannesburg covers Transvaal and Ciskei and the problems of violence in the townships, while the Durban team covers the question of violence in rural areas. Chief Emeka Anyaoku visited South Africa in May 1993 and met with President de Klerk, Mr. Mandela, other political leaders and officials of the National Peace Secretariat to discuss the negotiating process. 175/ The twenty-first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), held at Karachi from 25 to 29 April 1993, adopted a resolution on development in South Africa in which it, inter alia, called for the expeditious conclusion of negotiations on a new, non-racial and democratic constitution acceptable to the people of South Africa. 176/

C. Governments

197. In connection with the bill adopted on 23 September by the South African Parliament establishing TEC, and following Mr. Mandela's call for the lifting of all economic sanctions against South Africa and the decision on 8 October by the General Assembly to lift economic sanctions, several Governments, including those of the United States, Canada, Australia and India, announced a series of steps to lift economic sanctions against South Africa, including trade, investment and financial sanctions.

198. Earlier, in response to the resumption of multi-party negotiations in South Africa in April 1993, a number of Governments had announced plans to lift diplomatic and economic sanctions in anticipation of agreements regarding transitional structures in the country (see paras. 110-112).

199. On 15 March 1993, the Government of Norway announced the lifting of economic sanctions, including those on trade and investment, but stated that it

would continue to abide by the General Assembly's embargo on the sale of oil to South Africa and the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the Security Council since 1977. 177/ Earlier in October 1992, the Government of Sweden had decided to allow six Swedish firms to trade with South Africa. 178/ The Government of Kuwait has announced its willingness to trade with South Africa in all commodities other than oil and petroleum products. 179/

200. In response to requests for international assistance to disadvantaged communities in South Africa, several Governments increased their aid and assistance to South African non-governmental organizations involved in providing humanitarian assistance, education, training and health services in such communities. The Government of Japan made a further grant of R10 million to the Kagiso Trust, bringing its total contribution to R75 million since 1987. 180/ Japan also granted R600,000 to four drought relief and three educational projects for disadvantaged communities. 181/ The Southern Africa Education Trust Fund, a non-governmental organization assisted by the Government of Canada, announced a training programme for future public servants and media personnel in South Africa. 182/ The Government of Sweden stated that it would continue to grant financial assistance to organizations, including ANC, involved in religious, educational, cultural and human rights activities. 183/ The Government of Norway is currently assisting the Goldstone Commission with a financial grant and providing the service of two consultants for the newly established Institute for the Study of Public Violence in South Africa. The Institute will provide, among other things, for a comprehensive and coordinated computer-based information service on the issue of public violence and intimidation. 184/

201. Furthermore, the decision of the Nobel Prize Committee of the Norwegian Parliament to award the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Mr. Mandela and Mr. de Klerk received widespread acclaim. The international community was unanimous in congratulating the two recipients of the world's oldest and most prestigious peace award and paid tribute to the people and Government of Norway for their meaningful contribution to building confidence and national reconciliation in South Africa and elsewhere. It will be recalled that the Nobel Peace Prize had previously been awarded in 1960 to former ANC President Albert Luthuli and in 1985 to Archbishop Desmond Tutu for their important contributions to progress towards racial equality in South Africa (see para. 43). 185/

D. Non-governmental organizations

202. During the period under review a number of non-governmental organizations continued to monitor political developments in South Africa closely, called for the continual application of pressure on the Government of South Africa and warned against the premature lifting of sanctions.

203. Several non-governmental organizations, trade unions, churches and professional organizations also organized fact-finding missions to South Africa to observe first-hand and to report to their constituencies and the general public on the negotiations under way and on issues related to the ongoing violence, and to determine how their organizations could assist in fostering reconciliation and political tolerance, as well as to define programmes of assistance for social and economic development by holding meetings and discussions and workshops with their counterparts in South Africa.

204. In the context of strengthening non-governmental organization support for the process of peaceful change, the Special Committee contributed and supported, in particular, projects undertaken by the following organizations: the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, the City of London Anti-Apartheid Group, the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action Against Apartheid, the Shipping Research Bureau, based in the Netherlands, and the World Campaign against Nuclear and Military Collaboration with South Africa, based in Norway. The Africa Peace Committee, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law and the Washington Office on Africa, based in the United States, were also supported in a variety of projects undertaken.

205. With the financial support of the Special Committee against Apartheid, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement organized an international conference entitled "Southern Africa: Making Hope A Reality". The Conference, which also enjoyed the full support of OAU, addressed the twin objective of supporting and promoting the process of transforming South Africa from an apartheid State to a united and non-racial democracy, and considered the need for a new agenda of international solidarity with the people of southern Africa. It was opened by the Chairman of the Special Committee.

206. Attended by some 450 participants from over 40 countries, including the Secretary-General of OAU, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, four Foreign Ministers of South African countries and prominent figures from South Africa, the conference adopted a declaration (A/48/255-S/26048, annex I) in which it, among other things, noted that a serious obstacle to making hope a reality was that there were still elements in South Africa and southern Africa, some of whom enjoyed substantial external support, that were resisting genuine democratic change and did not share the vision of a new future in the region. It was agreed that, as the process of transition unfolded in southern Africa, the rest of the international community had to be ready to respond to new challenges. New forms of international solidarity would be required to help meet the needs of the changing situation.

VI. REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

207. In accordance with its mandate and pursuant to the policies and guidelines set by the General Assembly in its 1989 Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, as well as with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, the Special Committee continued to mobilize international support for the elimination of apartheid through the early establishment in South Africa of a society based on a broadly negotiated and agreed democratic and non-racial constitution, as envisaged in the Declaration. As a corollary to that effort, the Committee also geared its programme of work towards facilitating a peaceful and a stable transition in South Africa by promoting international assistance to help South Africans overcome the negative social and economic consequences of apartheid, through sectoral seminars on well-defined and specific topics, and consultations with relevant bodies of the United Nations system, Governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as other relevant groups both inside and outside South Africa.

208. In order to maintain a cohesive international solidarity with the South African people and to ensure that the transition process continued to receive unequivocal international support, as well as to maintain the long-standing consensus within the General Assembly with regard to South Africa, the Chairman of the Committee maintained close contact with groups and individuals in and outside South Africa, as well as with the Secretary-General and delegations at the United Nations, and consulted with them on issues relevant to the question of South Africa.

209. During the period under review, the Special Committee focused its attention on the persisting political violence and how to create an atmosphere of political tolerance; on new ways of effectively addressing the grave socio-economic inequalities in South Africa; how to promote attention to the urgent need for human resource development assistance for the disadvantaged sectors of the South African population; and how to devise means of ensuring that the international community continued to support the vulnerable and critical process still under way in South Africa.

Activities of the Special Committee

210. In implementing its programme of work, the Special Committee closely monitored and commented on developments in South Africa. It undertook missions and organized or participated in a number of conferences, seminars and hearings related to South Africa and the question of apartheid.

211. At its first meeting for 1993, on 2 February 1993, the Chairman of the Special Committee expressed the hope that with the establishment of a transitional authority, South Africa would enter into a qualitatively new stage on the road to a fully constitutional, non-racial and democratic society. He said that it might not be unrealistic to hope that by 1994 agreements would have been reached allowing for transitional arrangements to be in place for elections to be held for a constituent assembly and the establishment of an interim Government of national unity.

212. At the same meeting, the Chairman also outlined the different tasks of the Committee. A key objective for it in 1993 would be to support and encourage all political interlocutors in South Africa who were willing to participate in good

faith in the transition process. He underscored that, to achieve that end, the Special Committee had included in its programme of work a mission to South Africa to facilitate contact and consultations with leading representatives of the various parties involved in the negotiation process. He reiterated that, while the mandate and mission of the Special Committee was distinct from that of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa, both organs were supporting the same goals. The priority for the Special Committee was to continue to support the process of peaceful transformation of South Africa into a united, non-racial and democratic society and to continue to promote assistance to the disadvantaged sectors of the country.

1. Assessment and response to political developments in South Africa

213. In the period under review, the Special Committee, responding to political and other events inside South Africa, continued to issue statements intended to draw attention to developments there and to express its support for a continuation of the process even under difficult circumstances. The Committee also organized media encounters.

214. In addition, the Special Committee held meetings or briefings with representatives of Member States of the United Nations, including those of the Government of South Africa, and with other South Africans representing various and diverse segments of society.

215. On several occasions, the Chairman of the Committee met with the leadership of the national liberation movements to discuss developments in and the promotion of the peace process in South Africa.

216. The Chairman and other members of the Committee also met with Judge Richard Goldstone, Chairman of the Goldstone Commission, during his visit to New York in April 1993. That meeting afforded the Committee members an opportunity to exchange views with Judge Goldstone and to reiterate the support of the Special Committee for the work of his Commission.

217. The Special Committee was encouraged by the fact that what was once a strong international anti-apartheid movement had been substantially transformed into a very strong pro-democratic campaign for a new South Africa. Observing that in spite of positive developments in South Africa apartheid was not yet dead, the Special Committee emphasized that the support of the non-governmental organizations around the world remained vital during the transition period. Calling on the international community to support the ongoing democratic process in South Africa, the Special Committee unequivocally welcomed the decision reached by the multi-party negotiating forum to set 27 April 1994 as the date for South Africa's first non-racial elections.

218. The Special Committee noted that political violence in South Africa tended to escalate every time tangible progress was made in the multi-party negotiations. That tragic trend took on a particularly ominous dimension with the assassination of Chris Hani, General Secretary of CPSA, on 10 April 1993, in which members of a White supremacist organization were involved. As with every spate of violence, the Special Committee continued to emphasize the need to bring such senseless violence to an end, cautioning South African leaders not to allow those bent on derailing the renewed multi-party negotiations, which had brought together an unprecedented 26 political parties and organizations, to disrupt the process of peaceful political change.

219. Reflecting positive developments in South Africa, the Special Committee considered that the registers set up to discourage sports and to enforce a cultural boycott with South Africa had fulfilled their role and decided on 17 February 1993 that they should be discontinued. In its statement, the Special Committee commended all those who had foregone financial or other opportunities by refraining from sports or cultural contacts with South Africa in order to support international efforts to eliminate apartheid. 186/

220. Reacting to a police raid on the headquarters of PAC, the Special Committee on 25 May 1993 deplored the detention of a significant number of leaders of the Congress, including members of its team to the multi-party negotiations. It called on the South African authorities to take immediate steps to try to undo the damage caused by the police action. 187/

221. In a statement made on 20 July 1993, the Special Committee stressed that the multi-party negotiations remained the best means available for resolving differences, especially in preventing possible outbreaks of political violence, and for achieving a constitutional dispensation reflecting the goals and aspirations of all South Africans. It expressed deep concern over the possible withdrawal of CP and IFP from the multi-party negotiations and the view that the active participation of all parties, including those two, was crucial in continuing to build on the significant consensus already achieved on essential constitutional principles. 188/ In a statement issued on 10 September 1993, the Special Committee welcomed the historic agreement reached at the multi-party negotiations on transitional structures in South Africa. It noted that the milestone agreement would allow for the establishment of the long-awaited TEC, through which, for the first time, a non-racial governing body representing the diverse political and cultural groups in South Africa would share in the decision-making on a number of vital issues of governance during the period leading up to South Africa's first "one person, one vote" elections. 189/

222. All through the period under review the Special Committee continued to emphasize that the establishment of TEC was an imperative that would give greater credibility to the commitment of all major South African parties, especially of the National Party Government, to establish a united, non-racial and democratic society. The Committee, therefore, called on the parties and particularly the South African authorities to move the democratic process forward.

2. Consultations with anti-apartheid movements and non-governmental organizations

223. A consultation meeting was organized at Geneva on 30 November and 1 December 1992 by the Special Committee against Apartheid in cooperation with the British Anti-Apartheid Movement. The consultations were held, inter alia, to review developments in South Africa and to discuss the future role of anti-apartheid movements and non-governmental organizations, such as assisting in solving socio-economic problems during the transitional period and beyond.

224. Some 56 participants, representing national liberation movements recognized by the United Nations, various anti-apartheid and non-governmental organizations, and United Nations specialized agencies took part in the consultations. The participants adopted a proposal for action and a declaration.

225. The participants reviewed the political developments in South Africa and the response of the international community to them. They also assessed the role of their organizations and the collective response of anti-apartheid organizations and non-governmental organizations to evolving political developments in South Africa. Concluding that the Government of South Africa was to be held primarily responsible for the delays in the march to a democratic South Africa and for the political violence in the country, the participants mapped out in the proposal for action the role of their organizations, amongst other things, in continuing the ongoing information campaign; in promoting a climate of free political activity; and in supporting the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. The 12-point declaration reaffirmed the 1989 United Nations Declaration as the basis for attainment of a democratic and non-racial South Africa. 190/

3. Mission of the Chairman of the Special Committee to South Africa, 1 to 11 March 1993

226. In order to enable members of the Special Committee to obtain a first-hand understanding of various political factors influencing the transitional process in South Africa, the Special Committee included a mission to South Africa in its programme of work for 1993. The mission afforded the members of the delegation an opportunity to make an up-to-date assessment of how the political process of peaceful settlement could be further encouraged within the context of the work of the United Nations, as well as of the role the international community could play in that respect. The five-person mission, which took place from 1 to 11 March 1993, was led by the Chairman of the Special Committee. It established contact and held broad-based consultations with high-ranking representatives of major parties in the current political process and with a wide range of civic, religious, business, labour and media leaders, as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations and academic institutions.

227. Considering the views expressed in the course of the mission's visit to South Africa, it was the understanding of the mission that the process of change through peaceful negotiation was still fragile and needed a more active support by the international community. This would be particularly important in three areas of special concern with regard to South Africa's immediate and medium-term prospects for a stable transition to a non-racial democracy, namely, the threat to the process posed by political violence; the need for one-man-one-vote elections to be seen to be free and fair; and the need to facilitate the full participation of a new South Africa in international cooperation, in particular with regard to assistance for the reconstruction of its economy, bearing in mind the crucial need for a democratically elected Government to be able to begin meeting the high expectations of a majority of the population. The report of the mission (A/48/202-S/25895, annex) therefore recommended, inter alia, that the number and mandate of the present United Nations observers should be expanded to enable them to play a more active role in containing violence, that the United Nations should immediately begin examining the requirements as to functions and capabilities of international electoral monitors in South Africa and that deployment should begin several months in advance of the actual elections; that consideration should be given to modifying the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa to become a "United Nations Transition Mission in South Africa" with a view to promoting and assisting, as requested, the multi-party negotiations and the work of the National Peace Accord structures, and the monitoring of the election process. The mission report also recommended that the international community assist in voter education with regard to democratic core values and political tolerance, that the relevant bodies and

agencies of the United Nations system start detailed planning for programmes of socio-economic assistance coordinated with other international agencies, particularly in the health, housing, education and employment sectors, and that urgent consideration be given to convening a resource mobilization conference enabling a new Government, following one-man-one-vote elections, immediately to begin programmes, in cooperation with international agencies, for tangible change for disadvantaged South Africans.

4. Symposium on Political Tolerance in South Africa: Role of Opinion-makers and the Media, Cape Town, South Africa, 30 July to 1 August 1993

228. The Symposium on Political Tolerance in South Africa: Role of Opinion-makers and the Media was co-sponsored by the Special Committee with two South African non-governmental organizations, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa and the Institute for Multi-party Democracy. It was the first event ever co-sponsored by the Special Committee inside South Africa.

229. More than 80 participants, representing a broad spectrum of South African opinion-makers, media experts, academics, political scientists, trade unionists and international observers, took part in the Symposium. For two and a half days the participants undertook intensive deliberations on the critical and pressing issues concerning the role of South African opinion-makers and the media in covering and facilitating the transition to a new, non-racial and democratic South Africa. They focused on the need to promote tolerance and discussed possible strategies for achieving it through the media. Though there was no consensus on how the promotion of tolerance could be tackled collectively through the media, there was tangible agreement that certain steps needed to be taken to promote political tolerance. It was also agreed that the United Nations should share its valuable resources with the South African media on issues such as problems of transition and the role of the media in such circumstances. 191/

5. Joint North American/European NGO consultation held at Geneva on 30 and 31 August 1993

230. The Special Committee, in cooperation with the Geneva-based NGO Subcommittee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonization, organized a consultation between North American and European non-governmental organizations and some of their South African counterparts on the social and economic development needs in rural and township communities in South Africa and the role of international non-governmental organizations in helping them meet those needs. The consultation was also attended by representatives of United Nations specialized agencies.

231. The two-day consultation focused on the social and economic development needs of rural and township communities in South Africa and the role of international non-governmental organizations in helping them meet those needs. An additional goal of the consultation, taking into account recent political developments in South Africa, was to contribute to the development of an agenda of cooperation in direct response to priorities of disadvantaged communities and to provide an opportunity to discuss the potential of the international non-governmental organization community to assist in the mobilization of resources and the optimal use of resources that can be made available to South African

non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations. Some 65 participants from North America, Europe, South Africa and PAC took part in the consultation and at its conclusion reached an understanding on what cooperation was needed between international non-governmental organizations and their South African counterparts in developing and implementing projects at the grass-roots level. 192/

6. Cooperation with other United Nations bodies and other organizations

232. The Special Committee continued and indeed strengthened its policy of cooperation with other United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, non-governmental and anti-apartheid organizations, movements and groups. It was represented in their meetings when warranted and in instances where direct participation of the Committee was not possible, it sent statements and messages.

233. The Special Committee continued its close cooperation with the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa, the Commission against Apartheid in Sports, the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and the Trust Fund for South Africa. Its working relationship with a number of United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and departments was further enhanced, especially in the area of cooperation on matters related to South Africa. An added dimension was cooperation with the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa. Cooperation with the ILO Committee on Action against Apartheid and the Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, remained a high priority for the Committee.

234. The Special Committee, through its Chairman and other members of the bureau, was represented at meetings of OAU and those of its subsidiary organs. Notable among these were the Special Committee's participation in the ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers and the Summit of Heads of State and Government, held from 21 to 30 June 1993, at Cairo. Similarly, the Special Committee was represented by its Chairman at the Ministerial Meeting of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Bali, Indonesia, from 10 to 13 May 1993.

7. Observance of international days and round tables

235. In accordance with its mandate from the General Assembly, the Special Committee held meetings of observance on four designated international days, namely, the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (21 March 1992), the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa (16 June 1992), the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of Women in South Africa (9 August 1992) and the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners (11 October 1992).

236. As part of the activities in observance of the various international days, the Special Committee held round tables where critical issues pertinent to the particular observance were discussed. Experts in the area were invited along with prominent South African personalities, members of non-governmental organizations, representatives of United Nations bodies and other well-known individuals in order to discuss and analyse political and other developments relative to the observance at the various round tables.

8. Other activities

237. The Special Committee was invited and participated in the International Solidarity Conference organized by ANC from 19 to 21 February 1993 at Johannesburg. On 6 May 1993, the Chairman of the Special Committee addressed the Fourth Annual Conference of the NGO Subcommittee on Southern Africa in New York. While on official travel to southern Africa in July 1993, the Chairman utilized the opportunity to address the Commonwealth Heads of Mission Meeting at Harare on 29 July 1993 on the work of the Special Committee and its perspective on the political developments in South Africa.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

238. The process of peaceful settlement in South Africa was largely stalled in May 1992. Towards the end of 1992 several complex and interrelated factors, such as the widespread violence, continued economic down-turn and deteriorating socio-economic conditions, had led to a recognition that a resumption of multi-party negotiations was urgently needed in order to move the process forward again with a view to achieving a non-racial and democratic South Africa. Following a series of bilateral meetings between various parties, a preparatory meeting on 5 and 6 March 1993 led to the beginning of the Multi-party Negotiating Process on 1 April 1993.

239. That negotiating framework, which brought together 26 parties and was the most representative gathering in South African history, was a milestone in itself. Another salient feature has been that, in spite of frequent cases of violence and intimidation, the negotiations have not been disrupted. This new resilience of the negotiating process was perhaps most clearly demonstrated after the assassination on 10 April, only two weeks after the resumption of multi-party talks, of CPSA General Secretary Chris Hani, as well as after the sudden pre-dawn police raid and arrest of prominent PAC leaders and negotiators on 25 May and the large-scale and unhindered assault on the negotiating site by members of a White right-wing "resistance" group on 25 June 1993.

240. The ability of the negotiators to set a date for South Africa's first ever non-racial and democratic elections (27 April 1994) was another milestone, which was followed by the historical decisions on a TEC, on Independent Electoral and Media Commissions and on an Independent Broadcasting Commission, and their subsequent passage into law by the existing Parliament.

241. The suspension in recent months of their participation in the Multi-party Negotiating Process by some important parties has been an additional strain on the process, which the remaining parties have showed great perseverance and political maturity in trying to overcome, inter alia, by the discrete conduct of bilateral discussions with them. While there seems to be a clear determination by most of the major actors to continue a process of peaceful settlement despite the many obstacles and seemingly irreconcilable positions, the process of peaceful constitutional change, now moving towards a resolution, is still in need of active support from the international community.

242. In 1992 the Special Committee stated in its report that: 193/

> "Unfulfilled expectations of the Black majority, violence, deprivation and decay in the townships and huge unemployment may threaten to bring the country to the edge of a civil war. Under these circumstances, any delay in bringing about a political settlement could be disastrous. The economic price of delaying a settlement is also growing rapidly. These are powerful factors which should move all parties in South Africa to reach an agreement as soon as possible. Time is on no one's side."

243. Today this is clearly even more the case. With the economy tottering on the brink of a depression of unprecedented scale and with the very fabric of society threatened by the disintegration and collapse of all social norms, it is becoming increasingly clear that unless a credible, representative and legitimate Government is established soon through a democratic process, South Africa's many and pressing problems cannot be effectively addressed.

244. The United Nations needs to begin examining immediately the requirements as to functions and capabilities of international electoral monitors in South Africa. Consideration should be given to the fact that for the effective monitoring of the election process as a whole, deployment would need to begin several months in advance of the actual elections. Effective coordination with the Independent Electoral Commission, with the National Peace Accord structures and with already deployed international observers would be essential.

245. The nature of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa could perhaps be modified to become a "United Nations Transition Mission in South Africa", with a view to promoting and assisting, as requested, the multi-party negotiations; assisting the National Peace Accord structures in investigating violence; and monitoring the election process, including its technical preparation, and the conduct of the election campaign.

246. The international community should also be ready to assist in voter education with regard to democratic core values and political tolerance.

247. The Special Committee, therefore, recommends that the General Assembly:

(a) Reaffirm the objectives envisaged in the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, and the determination of the international community to continue its support to the South African people in its efforts to achieve a speedy and peaceful transition to a non-racial and democratic society in South Africa;

(b) Note with satisfaction the significant progress achieved through multi-party negotiations, and in particular the decision reached within their framework on a date for free and fair elections, and on the decisions, subsequently enacted into law, on the Independent Electoral Commission, the Independent Media Commission, the Independent Broadcasting Authority and on the Transitional Executive Council to oversee government policies and operations during the period leading up to the elections to ensure that they are free and fair;

(c) Welcome the process towards the adoption of an interim non-racial constitution;

(d) Welcome the agreement on 17 August 1993 to restore Walvis Bay to Namibia;

(e) Note that the broad spectrum of the people of South Africa believe enough progress has been made in the process of transition to democracy to necessitate the lifting of economic sanctions imposed on South Africa over the years and that the General Assembly has responded to the appeal that such sanctions be lifted;

(f) Request that mandatory measures imposed by the Security Council with regard to South Africa remain in effect and urge Member States to continue to respect them until the Council, in response to the election of a non-racial and democratic Government, may decide to lift them;

(g) Reiterate its strong support for the peaceful negotiation process and urge those parties which have suspended their participation in the multi-party negotiations to bring their contribution to the process and to its successful conclusion by returning to the framework of multi-party negotiations;

(h) Express its grave concern at the danger posed by the continued violence to the process of elections for South Africa's first non-racial and democratic Government and for a constituent assembly to adopt a constitution for a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society;

(i) Urge the South African authorities to exercise fully and impartially the primary responsibility of government to bring to an end the ongoing violence, to protect the lives, security and property of all South Africans and to promote and protect their right to participate in the democratic process, including the right to demonstrate peacefully in public, to organize and participate in political rallies in all parts of South Africa and to run for election and participate in the elections without intimidation;

(j) Call upon the South African authorities, in that context, to take the necessary measures for the peaceful re-incorporation of the "homelands" into South Africa and to ensure that the populations in those territories can freely participate in the elections and that all political parties will be able to run election campaigns there free of intimidation;

(k) Call, once more, upon the signatories to the National Peace Accord to recommit themselves to the process of peaceful change by fully and effectively implementing its provisions and by cooperating with each other to that end, and upon all parties in South Africa to refrain from acts of violence;

(l) Commend the Secretary-General for the additional deployment of observers in South Africa to further the purposes of the National Peace Accord and express its appreciation for the activities carried out by the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa;

(m) Express appreciation also for the deployment and activities of observers from OAU, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the European Community;

(n) Recommend an immediate expansion of the mandate and numbers of observers necessary to enable them to function as international election monitors in close coordination with the Independent Electoral Commission and to assist further the structures set up under the National Peace Accord;

(o) Appeal to the international community to keep up its humanitarian and legal assistance to the victims of apartheid, in particular, to the returning refugees and exiles, and to released political prisoners;

(p) Appeal also to the international community to help create stable conditions for the rapid and peaceful attainment of a new, democratic and non-racial South Africa by providing appropriate material, financial and other assistance to South Africans in their efforts to address the serious socio-economic problems that are the legacy of apartheid, particularly in the areas of human resource development, employment, health and housing;

(q) Request the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures for the initiation and coordination among the United Nations and its agencies of detailed planning for programmes of socio-economic assistance, particularly in the areas of human resource development, employment, health and housing, and to ensure also that those programmes are coordinated with other international agencies and with legitimate non-racial structures in South Africa;

(r) Commend the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Commonwealth for their initiative to start planning for an international donors'

conference on human resource development for post-apartheid South Africa, to take place following the election of a non-racial and democratic Government;

(s) Authorize the Special Committee against Apartheid, in bringing its mandate to fulfilment, to follow developments in South Africa closely; to facilitate a peaceful and stable transition in South Africa by promoting international assistance in helping South Africans to overcome the negative social and economic consequences of the policies of apartheid; to maintain contacts with academic institutions, the labour, business and civic communities, including community-based and other non-governmental organizations in South Africa; to consult with the parties participating in the political process, with legitimate non-racial structures and with a democratically elected non-racial Government with a view to making recommendations to the General Assembly and the Member States of the United Nations, inter alia, with regard to the question of a resumption of the participation of South Africa in the work of the Assembly; to submit, following the establishment of a democratically elected non-racial Government, a final report to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session; and to undertake other relevant activities aimed at supporting the political process of peaceful change until a democratically elected non-racial Government has been established in South Africa.

Notes

1/ The 26 participants in the Multi-Party Negotiating Process, in alphabetical order, are: African National Congress (ANC); Bophuthatswana Government; Cape Province Traditional Leaders (CPTL); Ciskei Government; Conservative Party (CP); Democratic Party (DP); Dikwankwetla party (Qwa Qwa); Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP); Intando Yesizwe Party (Kangwane); Inyandza National Movement (Lebowa); KwaZulu Government (also accepted as the Natal Traditional Leaders); Labour Party of South Africa (LP); Natal Indian Congress/Transvaal Indian Congress (joint delegation known as NIC/TIC); National Party (NP); National People's Party (NPP); Orange Free State Traditional Leaders (OFSTL); Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC); Solidarity; South African Communist Party (SACP); Government of South Africa; Transkei Government; Transvaal Traditional Leaders (TTL); United People's Front (UPF); Venda Government; and Ximoko xa Rixaka (also known as the Ximoko Progressive Party of Gazankulu).

2/ Sowetan (Johannesburg), 5 April 1993, and Southern African Report (Johannesburg), 14 May 1993.

3/ South Africa Barometer (Johannesburg), 9 April 1993, Sowetan (Johannesburg), 1 April 1993, and Financial Times (London), 11 June 1993.

4/ The Star (Johannesburg), 5-11 August and 29 July-4 August 1993, Financial Times (London), 11 August 1993, and Southscan (London), 13 August 1993.

5/ The Star (Johannesburg), 29 July-4 August 1993, and Sowetan (Johannesburg), 5 August 1993.

6/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 31 May 1993.

7/ The Economist (London), 11 September 1993.

8/ Southscan (London), 26 February 1993, The Star (Johannesburg), 23 February 1993, New Nation (Johannesburg), 11-17 June 1993, and Financial Times (London), 5 June 1993.

9/ See the letter dated 29 July 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the South African Mission to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (A/48/285-S/26198), The Star (Johannesburg), 10 September 1993, Pretoria News, 9 September 1993, and Business Day (Johannesburg), 9 September 1993.

10/ The Washington Post, 24 September 1993.

11/ Resolution on the processing of the accepted Transitional Executive Council Bill put to the Negotiating Council on 7 September 1993.

12/ The Guardian (London), 2 September 1993, and Pretoria News, 9 September 1993.

13/ The Guardian (London), 2 September 1993.

14/ Pretoria News (Pretoria), 9 September 1993, and Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 12 September 1993.

15/ Resolution on the processing of the accepted Transitional Executive Council Bill put to the Negotiating Council on 7 September 1993, and Pretoria News, 9 September 1993.

16/ The New York Times, 8 September 1993.

17/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/47/22), paras. 27-30, 50-52, 55 and 56.

18/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 26 October 1992.

19/ Ibid., 29 June 1993.

20/ The Citizen (Johannesburg) and Business Day (Johannesburg), 7 October 1992.

21/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 3 December 1992.

22/ The Washington Post, 13 February 1993.

23/ The Star (Johannesburg), 13-19 May 1993.

24/ The Guardian (London), 24 September 1993, The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 27 September 1993, and Financial Times (London), 25-26 September 1993.

25/ The Star (Johannesburg), 8-14 July 1993.

26/ DPI note on the press conference by Mr. Nelson Mandela, United Nations, 24 September 1993.

27/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 30 September 1993.

28/ The Washington Post, 8 October 1993.

29/ Address by ANC President Nelson Mandela at the meeting of the Special Committee against Apartheid, New York, 24 September 1993.

30/ Address by PAC Secretary-General Benny Alexander at the meeting of the Special Committee against Apartheid, New York, 28 September 1993.

31/ See the statement on developments in South Africa by the OAU Ad Hoc Committee, New York, 29 September 1993.

32/ SG/T/1823.

33/ Human Rights Commission of South Africa, Monthly Repression Reports, July and August 1993.

34/ The Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 6 August 1993.

35/ Debate of Parliament, fifth session, p. 2,233.

36/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 4 August 1993.

37/ Financial Times (London), 15 October 1993.

38/ The Guardian (London), 12 and 13 August 1993.

39/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 11 October 1993, and The Guardian (London), 12 October 1993.

40/ The Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 10 September 1993, and report of the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid on his mission to South Africa, 1-11 May 1993 (A/AC.115/L.693).

41/ The New York Times (24 June 1993).

42/ The Independent (London), 25 September 1993.

43/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 5 August 1993, and The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 6 August 1993.

44/ The Economist (London), 11 September 1993.

45/ Southscan (London), 24 September 1993.

46/ The New York Times, 24 and 31 August 1993, and Financial Times (London), 31 August 1993.

47/ The Washington Post, 26 November 1992, and The Citizen (Johannesburg), 22 December 1992.

48/ Southscan (London), 15 January 1993, and Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 8 January 1993.

49/ Southscan (London), 23 July 1993.

50/ South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, September 1993.

51/ Department of Finance, Economic Monitor, 24 February 1993.

52/ South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, June 1993.

53/ International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, July 1993. Employment in gold mining alone declined from 535,000 in 1987 to 395,000 in 1993 (Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 11 June 1993).

54/ Budget speech made on 17 March 1993 by Mr. Derek Keys, Minister of Finance.

55/ Financial Times (London), 3 and 4 July 1993.

56/ Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 27 May 1993.

57/ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, second quarter, 1993.

58/ Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 12-18 and 19-25 March 1993.

59/ The document was compiled by the Central Economic Advisory Service in consultation with the South African Reserve Bank, government departments and other institutions, and the Special Advisor to the Minister of Finance, who acted as coordinator. The references here are to the document and not to The Key Issues in the Normative Economic Model, which synthesizes the main report but gives more emphasis to broader socio-economic issues and provides different target values for a different time frame.

60/ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, second quarter 1993, Business Day (Johannesburg), 16 March 1993, The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 12-18 March 1993, and Southscan (London), 9 April 1993.

61/ The paper is a synthesis of some informal studies by the World Bank and discussions with South Africans and is not an official World Bank document.

62/ Work in Progress (Johannesburg), July 1993.

63/ Sowetan (Johannesburg), 4 August 1993, and Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 19 March 1993.

64/ The Washington Post, 17 January 1993.

65/ New Nation (Johannesburg), 12-18 March 1993.

66/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 14 July 1993.

67/ South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, Race Relations Survey, 1992-1993.

68/ South Africa: An Economic Profile, January 1993, compiled by the Economics Division, Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd., Johannesburg.

69/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 9-15 July 1993.

70/ Sowetan (Johannesburg), 11 August 1993.

71/ Ibid., 8 and 14 June 1993.

72/ New Nation (Johannesburg), 16-22 April 1993.

73/ Financial Times (London), 24 August 1993.

74/ The Economist (London), 20 March 1993.

75/ Sowetan (Johannesburg), 5 August 1993, and Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 19 March 1993.

76/ Southscan (London), 2 April 1993.

77/ New Nation (Johannesburg), 8-15 April 1993.

78/ Ibid., 11-17 June 1993.

79/ The Star (Johannesburg), 15-21 July 1993.

80/ The New York Times, 16 March 1993.

81/ New Nation (Johannesburg), 4-10 June 1993.

82/ Ibid., 2-8 April 1993.

83/ Southern African Report (Johannesburg), 8 January 1993, The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 22 February 1993, and The Washington Post, 27 February 1993.

84/ Southscan (London), 29 January 1993.

85/ Sowetan (Johannesburg), 17 May 1993.

86/ Southern African Report (Johannesburg), 14 May 1993.

87/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 5-11 March 1993.

88/ Ibid., 28 May-3 June 1993.

89/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 9 August 1993, and Anti-Apartheid News (London), July-August 1993.

90/ Southern African Report (Johannesburg), 8 January 1993, and Financial Times (London), 26 March 1993.

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92/ The New York Times, 12 February 1993.

93/ The Guardian (London), 12 January 1993.

94/ Official policy statement on the environment of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania by Barney Desai, Secretary for Publicity and Information, March 1992.

95/ South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey, 1992-1993.

96/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 5 and 12 May 1993.

97/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 26 November and 30 October 1992, and 16 and 23 March 1993, and The Star (Johannesburg), 3-9 December 1992.

98/ African Business, November 1992, and Business Day (Johannesburg), 12 March 1993.

99/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 12 March 1993, and The Citizen (Johannesburg), 26 April 1993.

100/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 12 January 1993.

101/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 26 April 1993.

102/ Southscan (London), 11 June 1993.

103/ The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 7 July 1993.

104/ The Star (Johannesburg), 29 July-4 August 1993.

105/ The New York Times, 24 September 1993.

106/ The Star (Johannesburg), 14-20 January 1993.

107/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 19 March 1993.

108/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 1 March 1993.

109/ New Nation (Johannesburg), 23-29 April 1993.

110/ Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 29 July 1993.

111/ The Star (Johannesburg), 5-11 August 1993.

112/ The Nation (Johannesburg), 29 August 1993.

113/ Southern African Report (Johannesburg), 26 March 1993.

114/ The Star (Johannesburg), 15-21 July 1993.

115/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 16 July 1993.

116/ Financial Times (London) and The Guardian (London), 28 September 1993.

117/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 30 July-5 August 1993.

118/ Southscan (London), 14 and 28 May 1993, Financial Times (London), 3 June 1993, and Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 4 June 1993.

119/ Southscan (London), 16 July 1993.

120/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 28 May 1993.

121/ Financial Times (London), 11 June 1993.

122/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 21 July 1993.

123/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 9-15 July 1993.

124/ Southscan (London), 14 May 1993.

125/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 15 May 1993.

126/ The Star (Johannesburg), 17-23 June and 29 July-4 August 1993, Financial Times (London), 11 June 1993, and New Nation (Johannesburg), 26 February-4 March 1993.

127/ Southern African Report (Johannesburg), 13 August 1993.

128/ Southscan (London), 9 July 1993.

129/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 19 February 1993, and South Africa Barometer (Johannesburg), 26 March 1993.

130/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 17 February 1993.

131/ Southscan (London), 19 February 1993.

132/ ARMSCOR Annual Report 1992-1993, released on 2 June 1993.

133/ Southscan (London), 14 May 1993.

134/ GA/AP/2109.

135/ United Nations press release SC/5525.

136/ Financial Times (London), 2 June 1993, and Anti-Apartheid News (London), June 1993.

137/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 20 November 1992.

138/ The Star (Johannesburg), 23 November 1992.

139/ Southscan (London), 8 January 1993.

140/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 18 June 1993.

141/ See the letter dated 2 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/48/128), annex.

142/ Shearar, Jeremy, "Denuclearization of Africa: The South African Dimension", in Disarmament, vol. XVI, No. 2, 1993.

143/ Speech by the State President, Mr. F. W. de Klerk, to a Joint Session of Parliament, 24 March 1993. (South African Mission press release No. 13/93.)

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147/ Southscan (London), 11 June 1993.

148/ See the report of the Secretary-General on a coordinated approach by the United Nations system on questions relating to South Africa (A/48/467 and Add.1).

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151/ United Nations press release IAEA 1251, 1 October 1993.

152/ Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the question of apartheid (S/25004).

153/ Ibid., para. 49.

154/ S/25004, para. 49.

155/ Ibid., para. 11.

156/ S/24389.

157/ S/25004, paras. 29-46.

158/ Ibid., paras. 80 and 81.

159/ See S/26347 and United Nations press release SC/5688, 24 August 1993.

160/ United Nations press release SG/SM/5104, SAF/160, 23 September 1993.

161/ S/26558.

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173/ The European Community's Special Programme on South Africa, EC publication, May 1993, pp. 6 and 7.

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176/ Resolution on the development of the situation in South Africa, No. 15/21-P.

177/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 16 March 1993.

178/ Ibid., 30 October 1993.

179/ Ibid., 10 June 1993.

180/ South African Press Association, 29 June 1993.

181/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 25 February 1993.

182/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 20 July 1993.

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184/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 29 April 1993.

185/ The Washington Post and The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 18 October 1993.

186/ GA/AP/2114.

187/ GA/AP/2122.

188/ GA/AP/2125.

189/ GA/AP/2132.

190/ For a report of the consultations, see A/AC.115/L.691.

191/ For a report of the Symposium, see A/AC.115/L.694.

192/ For a report of the consultation, see A/AC.115/L.695.

193/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 22 (A/47/22), para. 179.

ANNEX I

Composition of the Special Committee against Apartheid and its subsidiary bodies, and of the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa

A. Special Committee against Apartheid

1. The Special Committee against Apartheid, established by the General Assembly in its resolution 1961 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, is composed of the following 17 Member States:

Algeria	Malaysia	Sudan
Ghana	Nepal	Syrian Arab Republic
Guinea	Nigeria	Trinidad and Tobago
Haiti	Peru	Ukraine
India	Philippines	Zimbabwe
Indonesia	Somalia	

2. At its 663rd meeting, on 2 February 1993, the Special Committee unanimously re-elected Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari (Nigeria) as its Chairman, and Mr. Jayaraj Acharya (Nepal), Mr. Victor Batiouk (Ukraine) and Mrs. Annette des Iles (Trinidad and Tobago) as its Vice-Chairmen. Mr. Suresh K. Goel (India) was re-elected as its Rapporteur.

3. At the same meeting, the Special Committee re-elected Mr. Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor (Ghana) as Chairman of its Subcommittee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions on South Africa, and Mr. Simbarashe Simbanenduku Mumbengegwi (Zimbabwe) as Chairman of its Subcommittee on Developments in South Africa.

B. Subsidiary bodies of the Special Committee

Subcommittee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions on South Africa:

Ghana (Chairman), Guinea, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic.

Subcommittee on Developments in South Africa:

Algeria, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Zimbabwe (Chairman).

C. Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa

Algeria, Cuba (Rapporteur), Indonesia, Kuwait (Vice-Chairman), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania (Chairman).

ANNEX II

Chronology of statements issued by the Special Committee

GA/AP/2112 (2 February)	Apartheid practices must not be tolerated beyond 1993, Special Committee against Apartheid is told Committee re-elects officers, begins work for year
GA/AP/2113 and Rev.1 (9 February)	Chairmen of Anti-Apartheid Committee, Commission against Apartheid in Sports issue joint text mourning death of Arthur Ashe
GA/AP/2114 (17 February)	Anti-Apartheid Committee discontinues registers set up to discourage sports and cultural contacts with South Africa
GA/AP/2115 (24 February)	Special Committee against Apartheid to undertake mission of consultations to South Africa, 1-11 March 1993
GA/AP/2116 (16 March)	Anti-Apartheid Committee to observe International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
GA/AP/2117 (22 March)	Special Committee against Apartheid commemorates International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
GA/AP/2118 (22 March)	Secretary-General, on International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, says era dawning of new, non-racial, democratic South Africa
GA/AP/2119 (29 March)	Anti-Apartheid Committee to pay tribute to first world boxing champion from Africa who died in 1925
GA/AP/2120 (12 April)	Anti-Apartheid Committee deplores assassination of Chris Hani in South Africa, says his murder must not disrupt process of peaceful political change
GA/AP/2121 (26 April)	Special Committee against Apartheid pays tribute to ANC leader Oliver Tambo
GA/AP/2122 (25 May)	Special Committee against Apartheid deplores detention of PAC leaders by South African Police, calls for their immediate release
GA/AP/2123 (8 June)	Anti-Apartheid Committee to observe Soweto Day on 16 June
GA/AP/2124 (16 June)	Goal of democratic, non-racial and united South Africa must remain priority of world community, Secretary-General says on anniversary of Soweto Day

GA/AP/2125 (20 July)	Special Committee against Apartheid expresses concern at reported pull-out of two political parties from multi-party talks
GA/AP/2126 and Rev.1 (21 July)	Symposium on Political Tolerance in South Africa to be held in Cape Town, 30 July to 1 August
GA/AP/2127 (27 July)	Special Committee against Apartheid to observe International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of Women in South Africa
GA/AP/2128 (4 August)	Role of media in promoting culture of democracy, peace highlighted at Symposium on Political Tolerance in South Africa
GA/AP/2129 (9 August)	Special Committee against Apartheid commemorates International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of Women of South Africa
GA/AP/2130 (16 August)	Anti-Apartheid Committee to hold joint American/European NGO consultation at Geneva, 30-31 August
GA/AP/2131 (31 August)	Anti-Apartheid Committee concludes meeting with North American/European and South African NGOs
GA/AP/2132 (10 September)	Special Committee against Apartheid welcomes multi-party agreement on transitional structure in South Africa
GA/AP/2133 (23 September)	Nelson Mandela to address Special Committee against Apartheid on 24 September
GA/AP/2134 (24 September)	Nelson Mandela calls for lifting of economic sanctions against South Africa
GA/AP/2135 (28 September)	Anti-Apartheid Committee to observe Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners on 11 October
GA/AP/2136 (28 September)	Sanctions against South Africa should be maintained until new Government is elected, Benny Alexander tells Special Committee against Apartheid
GA/AP/2137 (11 October)	Special Committee against Apartheid observes Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners
GA/AP/2138 (11 October)	Statement by Assembly President at observance of Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners
GA/AP/2139 (15 October)	Special Committee against Apartheid pays tribute to Mandela and De Klerk on being awarded 1993 Nobel Peace Prize

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